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ABSTRACT
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the separation of ownership and control in 
the modem corporation may lead to agency conflicts between principals (shareholders 
and debtholders) and agents (managers). That is, managers may not always allocate 
corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. Managers may also 
engage in activities that reallocate wealth from debtholders to shareholders.
Recent literature in CEO compensation provide empirical evidence that CEO 
inside debt holdings may mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and debt 
holders by aligning the interests o f mangers with those o f debt holders. Two components 
o f CEO inside debt compensation: pension and deferred compensation may mitigate 
agency conflicts between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Eluang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 
2012). In the language o f  Jensen and Meckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed 
obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is 
typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded 
nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatment 
as outside debt holders. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause managers 
to manage their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 
2011). Studies on CEO inside debt compensation are limited due to data availability.
CEO inside debt compensation is available only from 2006 fiscal year as effective for 
2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that firms disclose their CEOs’ 
inside debt positions. In this dissertation, I examine the effect o f  CEO inside debt 
compensation on two different corporate policies: corporate cash holdings and mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A).
In the first chapter, I examine the effect CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash 
holdings, as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets using a 
sample o f EXECUCOMP firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Following prior 
literature on CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the following two 
measures as proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to firm debt/equity 
ratio, which is calculated as the CEO’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to 
equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity 
ratio is greater than one. Higher CEO inside debt compensation alleviates agency 
conflicts between managers and debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders. 
CEOs with higher inside debt may prefer to invest in cash as cash holdings are less risky 
projects (Tong, 2010). Consequently, based on risk-aversion hypothesis, I posit a positive 
relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate cash holdings. I find a 
significant and positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash 
holdings. I find that the positive relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm 
cash holdings remain significant even after controlling for the effect o f CEO equity-based 
incentives on firm cash holdings. I also find that the positive relation between CEO 
inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings is mitigated by the financial constraint status 
o f  the firm based on the notion that CEOs o f a financially constrained firms may face
difficulty accumulating excess cash as their inside debt compensation goes up since 
capital is limited. I adopt instrumental variable approach to explicitly address the 
endogeneity problem as CEO compensation is endogenously determined by firm and 
CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias corrections and 
findings are robust to alternative specifications. Utilizing a modified version o f the Fama 
and French (1998) valuation regression, I find that cash increases have a more positive 
valuation effect for firms with low levels o f  CEO inside debt relative to those with high 
levels o f CEO inside debt.
In the second chapter I investigate the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on 
post-merger firm risk using acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f 2007 to 2009. I 
utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and 
post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the Merton 
distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the change in pre 
and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model 
(Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-merger minus pre-merger 
stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in idiosyncratic risk measured 
as post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage 
estimated by the single factor market model. Following prior literature on CEO inside 
debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio>l, a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio is greater than one, to proxy for CEO inside debt compensation. Prior 
literature on CEO inside debt finds that CEO inside debt compensation motivates CEOs 
to engage in less risky investment and financial decisions. For example, Cassell, Huang,
Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f  CEO inside debt are associated with 
less risky investment and financial policies. Based on empirical findings o f prior 
literature, I conjecture a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and post­
merger firm risk. I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as 
measured by change in total firm risk, measured as post-merger minus pre-merger stock 
return standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as 
post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage 
estimated by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured 
by the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. I adopt instrumental variable approach to address 
the endogeneity problem as CEO compensation is endogenously determined by firm and 
CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias corrections.
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C H A P T E R  1
CEO INSIDE DEBT CORPORATE 
CASH HOLDINGS
Introduction
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) posits that agency conflicts between 
principals (shareholders and debtholders) and agent (managers) exist in modern 
corporations as the goals and desires o f agents may not be consistent with those of 
principals. Managers, as a result, may not always use the firm ’s capital in a manner that 
maximizes shareholder’s wealth and mangers may engage in activities that reallocate 
wealth from debtholders to shareholders. Theoretically, managerial equity-based 
compensation aligns manager’s interest with those o f  shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Several studies examine the managerial incentive effects o f equity-based 
compensation and provide empirical evidence on whether managerial stock and stock 
option ownership impact firm performance and particular corporate decisions and 
policies.1 Nevertheless, excessive equity-based compensation may motivate managers to 
take more risk than debtholders prefer.
Pension and deferred compensation, inside debt, may mitigate agency conflicts 
between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 
2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012).
1 See for exam ple, C ore, Guay, and Larcker (2 0 0 3 ) for a rev iew  o f  literature.
1
2In the language o f Jensen and Meckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed 
obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is 
typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded 
nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatment 
as outside creditors. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause CEOs to 
manage their firms more conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu,
2011 ).
Corporate liquidity policy seems an ideal area to explore the link between CEO 
compensation incentives and shareholder-debtholder conflicts. Excessive equity-based 
compensation may motivate mangers to hold smaller cash balances than debtholders 
desire. Inside debt compensation may motivate managers to manage firms conservatively 
by holding higher cash balances. I examine the effect o f  CEO inside debt on corporate 
cash holdings in this paper.
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders occur when managers do 
not allocate corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. For example, 
a primary agency conflict between managers and shareholders involves the 
overinvestment o f free cash flows -  managers may choose to invest in negative net 
present value projects. Prior literature in executive compensation suggests that equity- 
based compensation acts as a vehicle to resolve the conflicts o f  interests between 
managers and shareholders. For example, prior studies suggest that stock and stock 
options encourage risk-averse CEOs to manage their firms in ways that benefit 
shareholders (Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009).
3Agency conflicts between managers (or managers acting for shareholders) and 
debt holders occur when managers increase firm risk in ways that benefit shareholders at 
the expense of debt holders. Debt holders and shareholders have different payoff 
structures -  debt holders are fixed claimants to firm assets while shareholders are residual 
claimants. Once debt is issued, shareholders may increase the value o f their residual 
claims at the expense o f debt holders. For instance, shareholders may increase the risk of 
the firm by changing investment or financial policies (asset substitution or risk shifting) 
in ways that reallocate wealth from debt holders, generally through some increase in the 
overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
Similarly, lower cash holdings may increase agency conflicts between managers and 
debtholders by increasing firm risk beyond what debtholders prefer.
While equity-based compensation mitigates agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, equity-based compensation may also exacerbate agency conflicts 
between managers and debt holders by motivating CEOs to increase risk beyond that 
which debtholders prefer. Higher managerial inside debt serves to alleviate agency 
conflicts between managers and debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders. For 
example, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO 
inside debt are associated with less risky investment and financial policies. This suggests 
that CEO inside debt compensation may also be associated corporate liquidity policy.
I examine the effect of CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings, 
as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets using a sample of 
EXECUCOMP firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Specifically, I test whether CEO 
inside debt is positively or negatively correlated with cash holdings. Higher CEO inside
4debt compensation alleviates agency conflicts between managers and debt holders by 
aligning mangers with debt holders. For example, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart 
(2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are associated with less risky 
investment and financial policies. CEOs with higher inside debt may prefer to invest in 
cash as cash holdings are less risky projects (Tong, 2010). Therefore, based on risk- 
aversion hypothesis, I posit a positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and 
corporate cash holdings. Conversely, CEOs with debt-like compensation bear a lower 
cost o f borrowing (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2010). This provides firms with 
easier access to external financing. Similarly, creditors anticipate that mangers with high 
inside debt compensation will pursue less risky policies and require fewer covenants 
limiting their investing, financing, and payout decisions after debt issuance 
(Anantharaman et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010). Thus, based on costly external 
finance hypothesis (Liu and Mauer, 2011), CEOs with higher inside debt may hold less 
cash as a hedge for future financing needs.
I begin by examining the effect o f  CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash 
holdings, measured as the ratio o f  cash plus marketable securities to net assets where net 
assets is equal to total assets minus cash plus marketable securities. The main explanatory 
variable o f interest is CEO inside debt holdings. Following previous empirical studies on 
CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use two measures as proxies for CEO 
inside debt holdings: 1) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable equal 
to one if the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is greater than one. Utilizing a 
contemporaneous regression where cash and all independent variables including CEO 
inside debt holdings are measured at time t, I find a positive relation between CEO inside
5debt holdings and firm cash holdings. I next examine the relation between firm cash 
holdings and lagged CEO inside debt holdings to mitigate the endogeneity problem and 
the positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings still hold. 
Further, I use a two-stage regression analysis to explicitly control for the endogeneity 
problem and I find that the main results o f CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash 
holdings still hold. I next divide the CEO inside debt compensation into two main 
components: pension and deferred compensation and examine the effect o f these two 
components on firm cash holdings to find out the main driving channel o f the positive 
relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings. I find that the 
deferred compensation is the main driving channel behind the positive relation between 
CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings.
Though CEO inside debt compensation induces CEOs to hold cash, CEOs may 
face constraints in their ability to hold excess cash. Financial constraint status o f the firm 
is one o f the constraining factor and the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and 
firm cash holdings could depend on whether a firm is financially constrained. CEOs of a 
financially constrained firms may face difficulty accumulating excess cash as their inside 
debt compensation goes up since capital is limited. This implies that the positive relation 
between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt compensation may be mitigated by 
financial constraint status o f the firm. To examine whether financial constraint status o f a 
firm influences the relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash 
holdings, I interact CEO inside debt compensation with several variables that proxy for 
the degree to which a firm is financially constrained. I find significant negative 
coefficients on the interaction terms which imply the mitigating role o f  financial
6constraint status o f  the firm on the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO 
inside debt holdings.
Following Cassell et al. (2012), I construct the ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity of 
the value o f the CEO’s accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change 
in the volatility o f stock prices) to delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f  the CEO’s equity- 
based compensation to one percent change in the stock price) to control for the effects of 
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences and corporate cash holdings. I 
include CEO vega/delta ratio in all regressions as a control variable and find a positive 
relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. My empirical finding that firm 
cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt compensation mimics the findings o f  Liu 
and Mauer (2011) who investigate the effect o f CEO equity-based incentives on firm 
cash holdings. In their study, Liu and Mauer (2011) document a positive relation between 
equity-based incentives as measured by the sensitivity o f equity compensation to 
volatility (vega) and firm cash holdings. I examine these separate effects by including 
both CEO inside debt compensation and vega in the cash regression and find that the 
positive effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash holdings remains significant 
even after controlling for the effect o f vega.
Finally, I examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive 
(negative) valuation effect for firms with lower CEO inside debt. Following Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2006), I use a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) 
valuation regression. I find that cash increases have a more positive valuation effect for 
firms with low levels o f CEO inside debt relative to those with high levels o f CEO inside 
debt.
7This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on 
executive compensation focus on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and fixed 
(salary and bonus) compensation, while few studies examine debt-like compensation. 
This paper extends the literature which investigates the incentive effects o f various 
components o f CEO wealth, particularly CEO equity holdings (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal, 
and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Focusing on a different component 
o f  CEO compensation, inside debt, this study provides evidence o f the effect CEO inside 
debt compensation on corporate cash holdings.
Second, this study contributes to a nascent literature on executive compensation 
which investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigates agency costs of 
debt by strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). To date, extant research (Anantharaman, Fang, 
and Gong, 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011; Wei and 
Yermack, 2011; Francis and Yilmaz, 2012; Fie, 2011) has focused on market-based 
implications o f CEO inside debt holdings (e.g. reduced cost o f  debt, fewer restrictive debt 
covenants, market reactions after initial disclosures o f CEO inside debt compensation, 
financial reporting quality, etc.). In contrast, this study provides direct evidence o f the 
effect o f CEO inside debt on firm investment and financial policies by examining the 
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and corporate cash holdings. I extend 
Cassell et al., (2012), who look at the effect o f  CEO inside debt holdings on firm 
investment and financial policies, by investigating the effect of CEO inside debt on
8corporate cash holdings. Further, I extend Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2012), who look at 
the effect o f  CEO inside debt on the marginal value o f cash to shareholders, by utilizing a 
valuation regression, a total firm value approach which yields a net value o f cash that 
combines the assessments o f both shareholders and debtholders.
Finally, this study adds to the corporate cash holdings literature by documenting 
the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings. Prior literature 
documents several motives for firms to hold cash3: the transaction motive, the 
precautionary motive, the tax motive, and the agency motive. The literature on corporate 
cash holdings empirically examines agency theory by viewing cash holdings as a source 
of financing. My study contributes to the agency motive view of corporate cash holdings 
literature by focusing on the investment perspective o f cash holdings and by exploring 
the link between CEO inside debt and corporate cash-holdings.
I organize the remainder o f this paper as follows. I discuss my research, review 
the literature, and develop the hypotheses; then comes an overview o f sample selection 
and variables used in this study, methodology, and a description o f my sample. The 
empirical results and conclusion complete the first essay.
Literature Review
Corporate Cash Holdings and Agency Costs 
Corporate liquidity policy is regarded as one o f the firm’s most important 
decisions. This is especially true as prior studies document that US firms hold a large
2 C asseil et al. (2 0 1 2 ) find a positive  relation betw een C E O  inside debt and asset liquid ity, m easured by 
w orking capital. In m y sam ple for this study, the correlation betw een  w orking capital and firm cash  
holdings is not significant.
3 See Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2 0 0 9  for details about w hy firm s hold cash.
9portion o f their assets in the form o f cash. For example, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) 
find that the average cash-to-assets ratio more than doubles from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% 
in 2006. Based on Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), there are four main motives for firms 
to hold cash: the transaction motive (Baumol, 1952; M iller and Orr, 1966; Mulligan,
1977)4; the precautionary motive (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999)5; the 
tax motive (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007)6; and the agency motive (Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Dittmar, and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson, 2006; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008).
This study focuses primarily on the agency motive o f cash holdings. Prior 
literature focuses on whether the agency theory explains the level o f corporate cash 
holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003; Dittmar, Mahrt- 
Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006), and whether corporate cash 
holdings affect firm value through the agency problem (Harford, 1999). While Opler et 
al. (1999) do not find support for the agency motive using managerial ownership as the 
combined measure for the free cash flow hypothesis and risk-reduction hypothesis, other 
researchers find support. Dittmar et al. (2003) find that corporate cash holdings in 
different countries are affected by the degree o f shareholder protection from law and 
firms hold more cash in countries with greater agency problems. Consistent with free 
cash flow hypothesis, Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich firms are more likely to make
4 Transaction m otive focuses on the need to conserve on the cost o f  converting non-financial a ssets into 
cash and posits that firm s that are more likely  to incur higher transaction costs are exp ected  to maintain  
higher cash balances.
5 T he precautionary m otive posits that firms hold cash to m eet the needs o f  the firm s w hen it faces  
unanticipated con tin gen cies and when access to capital markets is costly .
6 The tax m otive predicts that U S firms that w ould  incur tax con seq u en ces related w ith repatriating foreign  
earnings hold higher cash balances.
10
value-decreasing acquisitions. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2006) find that cash is worth less when agency problems between insiders 
and outside shareholders are greater. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that 
entrenched managers are more likely to build excess cash balances but spend excess cash 
quickly.
The agency theory explanation for cash holdings includes both the free-cash flow 
hypothesis and risk-reduction hypothesis. According to the free-cash flow hypothesis, 
cash is viewed as a source o f financing available to the manager who serves his own 
interest at the cost o f shareholders’ wealth (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). Risk-reduction 
is a typical agency problem originating from different risk preferences between managers 
and shareholders. The risk-reduction hypothesis posits that cash holdings are risk-free 
investments and so, a risk-averse and self-interested manager allocates higher corporate 
cash holdings to reduce firm risk. For instance, Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that a risk- 
averse manager may select lower NPV but less risky investment projects, which can 
reduce firm value.
As noted above, previous studies on corporate cash holdings primarily focus on 
the free-cash flow hypothesis. However, there are limited studies which explore the risk- 
reduction hypothesis in the context o f corporate cash holdings. Consistent with risk- 
related agency theory, Tong (2010) finds that firms with higher CEO risk incentives have 
less cash holdings using a sample o f 1,768 firms from 1993 to 2000. Conversely, Liu and 
Mauer (2011) find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and 
cash holdings utilizing a sample o f EXECUCOMP firms from 1992 to 2006. Liu and 
Mauer (2011) measure the marginal value o f cash to shareholders and find that high CEO
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vega is associated with a lower value o f cash. This empirical evidence is also consistent 
with the costly contracting hypothesis, which posits that debtholders expect greater risk- 
taking in high vega firms and so, require greater liquidity.
Inside Debt Compensation as a Means to 
Reduce Agency Costs o f Debt
Many CEOs in the US hold significant amounts o f  pay in the form of defined 
benefit pension plans and deferred compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei 
and Yermack, 2011). These forms o f executive compensation are defined as inside debt 
(in the language o f  Jensen and Meckling (1976)) as this compensation represents fixed 
obligation for the firm to make future payments to corporate insiders. Inside debt 
compensation are unsecured and unfunded, exposing CEOs to the same default risks and 
insolvency treatment as outside creditors. Therefore, CEO inside debt compensation can 
be used as a vehicle to mitigate the agency costs o f  debt (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2011; Cassell et al.,
2012 ).
Agency costs o f debt occur when managers vary the firm’s investment policy, 
payout policy, or capital structure in ways that reallocate wealth from debtholders to 
stockholders, generally through some increase in the overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). To alleviate the agency costs o f debt, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) recommend implementing an optimal incentive structure 
under which the CEO’s personal holdings o f the firm ’s debt and equity ratio is similar to 
the firm’s overall capital structure. Based on agency theory, studies on CEO inside debt 
compensation find that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings prefer less risky 
investment and financial policies (Cassell et al., 2012). Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
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find that as the value o f a CEO’s pension increases relative to the value o f her equity 
holdings, risk taking, as measured by distance-to-default declines. Wei and Yermack 
(2 0 1 1 ) examine stockholder and bondholder reactions to firms’ initial reports o f  their 
CEOs’ inside debt positions in early 2007 when new SEC disclosure rules took effect. 
The authors find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility o f both 
securities drops upon disclosures by firms where the CEO has a sizeable defined benefit 
pension or deferred compensation. This suggests that inside debt may reduce firm risk 
and transfer wealth from equity toward debt. This is also consistent with the idea that 
investors anticipate less risk taking by managers with higher levels o f  inside debt.
Several recent studies also find a negative relation between CEO inside debt 
holdings and the cost o f debt (Anantharaman et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; 
Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011). When compensation packages o f  CEOs consist o f  both inside 
debt compensation and equity-based compensation, CEO incentives vary with the relative 
importance o f debt versus equity based compensation in the pay structure (inside leverage 
o f the CEO). The higher a CEO’s inside leverage relative to firm leverage (the CEOs’ 
relative leverage), the more closely the CEO’s incentives are aligned with debtholders 
vis-a-vis shareholders and the lesser the degree to which CEO engages in risk-seeking 
behavior to damage debt holders wealth (Edmans and Liu, 2011). Anantharaman et al.
(2010) argue that if  debtholders realize the incentive effects o f  CEO inside debt holdings, 
firms providing CEOs with higher relative leverage should bear a lower borrowing cost 
and fewer covenants. Utilizing a sample o f private loans originated during 2006-2008, 
they find that higher CEO relative leverage is associated with lower cost o f  debt 
financing and fewer restrictive covenants. Wang et al. (2011) posit that banks demand
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lower yield spreads and less strict terms on loans to firms where CEOs have large inside 
debt holdings.
Using a sample o f  1,280 loan facilities for 676 unique firms originated for the 
period o f 2007 to 2010, they find that banks charge lower yield spreads on loans when 
CEOs of those firms hold larger inside debt holdings. Empirical evidence also shows that 
loans to firms providing CEOs with larger inside debt holdings are associated with fewer 
covenant restrictions. This is consistent with the view that debtholders anticipate lower 
expropriation risk by firms with larger CEO inside debt holdings. For instance, Chen, 
Dou, and Wang (2010) find that public debtholders charge lower interest rates to firms 
providing CEOs with more inside debt. In addition, they find that the level o f CEO inside 
debt holdings exhibits a negative relation with restrictive debt covenants. In summary, 
these studies suggest that CEOs with higher inside debt compensation are associated with 
lower borrowing costs o f debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants.
Hypothesis Development
CEO inside debt compensation mitigates agency costs o f debt by aligning 
interests o f CEOs with those o f debtholders. Prior studies find that the firms whose CEOs 
are paid with inside debt holdings manage firms more conservatively as inside debt 
reduces CEOs’ excessive risk-taking incentives. Since investment in cash lowers overall 
firm risk, an increase in CEO inside debt should increase cash holdings. This indicates a 
positive relation between CEO inside debt and the cash holdings of a firm.
H,: Cash holdings increase in CEO inside debt holdings.
Conversely, firms that encourage less risk-taking with high inside debt 
compensation may find it easier to raise external capital. Debtholders recognize the
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incentive effects o f CEO inside debt holdings. Therefore, firms providing their CEOs 
with debt-like compensation bear a lower cost o f  borrowing. Hence, firms have better 
access to external financing market when CEO pay packages consist o f a substantial 
amount o f inside debt holdings. Debtholders also recognize the incentive effects o f  CEO 
inside debt holdings. Firms providing their CEOs with debt-like compensation bear fewer 
covenants limiting their investing, financing, and payout decisions after debt issuance. 
All these indicate a negative relation between CEO inside debt and cash holdings o f a 
firm.
H2: Cash holdings decrease in CEO inside debt holdings.
Sample Selection and Data
Sample Selection
Data for this study comes from the followings sources: CEO compensation data 
from EXECUCOMP; corporate cash holdings and other accounting data from 
COMPUSTAT; stock price data from Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), 
governance variables from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required all firms to expand 
executive compensation disclosure effective in 2006 fiscal year end. Therefore, 2006 
marks the beginning o f my sample period because this is the first year that 
EXECUCOMP reports CEO pension and deferred compensation information.
I use the Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP database to create an initial sample 
o f US firms from 2006 fiscal year to 2008 fiscal year. EXECUCOMP includes annual 
compensation data from proxy statements for the five highest paid executives for firms in 
the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. Following previous
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literature, I exclude all financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) as liquidity is hard to 
access in these firms. I also exclude all utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) due to their 
unique regulatory environment. I then match this sample with COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and 
IRRC for accounting data, stock return data, and governance data respectively.
The initial sample o f EXECUCOMP is matched with COMPUSTAT Annual 
Industrial file and Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) databases from 2006 
to 2008. I exclude all financial and utility firms (SIC code o f  4900-4949 and 6000-6999), 
all leverage buyouts (LBO) firms (stock code four in CRSP), and all firms that 
incorporate abroad (incorporation code 99 in Compustat). I further limit my sample to 
ordinary common shares (share code 10 or 11 in CRSP). This excludes certificates, 
Americus trust components, closed-end funds, ADRs, shares o f beneficial interest, units, 
and REITs from analysis. I delete any observations with missing values on CEO pension, 
deferred compensation, and CEO stock incentives. After deleting observations with 
missing values for these variables, I have a final matched sample o f 1,859 firm-year 
observations from 2006 to 2008. My sample is comparable with recent studies on CEO 
inside debt holdings using the EXECUCOMP database over the period 2006 to 2008 
(Cassell et al., 2012; Cen, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2011). I then match this final sample with 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) for governance variables and sub­
sample is smaller due to the data availability from IRRC.
My final sample does not include 453 firms which have zero debt or missing debt. 
This may raise a question if  CEO inside debt compensation does not matter for all-equity 
firms. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that the incentive impact o f debt and equity 
holdings o f CEOs depends on the capital structure o f  the firm. When a firm has debt and
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equity in its capital structure, then the CEO tends to shift risk from shareholders to 
debtholders if  the CEO has only equity holdings in the firm. Compensating CEOs with 
pension and deferred compensation aligns interests o f CEOs with that o f  debtholders 
which in turn, reduces agency costs o f  debt. CEO inside debt compensation impacts on 
decision-making by CEOs only when firm has debt in the capital structure. Therefore, 
CEO inside debt compensation does not matter for all-equity firms as risk shifting from 
shareholders to debtholders by CEOs does not happen for these firms.
Variable Descriptions 
The primary variable is corporate cash holdings. The primary independent 
variable is CEO inside debt compensation. I also include several additional control 
variables that are related to both corporate cash holdings and CEO inside debt 
compensation. Appendix A provides detailed definition o f the dependent and independent 
variables utilized in my analysis.
Corporate Cash Holdings
The primary dependent variable for this study is corporate cash holdings o f  a firm. 
Following prior literature (for example, Opler et al., 1999), I measure corporate cash 
holdings as the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are 
total assets minus cash and marketable securities. I also measure corporate cash holdings 
as cash and marketable securities to total assets and my results are similar if  I use this 
alternative measure o f corporate cash holdings.
CEO Inside Debt Compensation
The primary explanatory variable is CEO inside debt holdings. Following prior 
literature on CEO inside debt holdings (for example, Cassell et al., 2012), I use two
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measures for CEO inside debt holdings: 1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an 
indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than 
one. The first measure, the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, is calculated as the CEO’s 
debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio. The CEO’s debt/ equity ratio is 
calculated as CEO inside debt holdings scaled by CEO equity holdings. CEO inside debt 
holdings are calculated as the sum o f the present value o f accumulated pension benefits 
and deferred compensation. CEO equity holdings are calculated as the value o f both stock 
and stock options held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated by multiplying 
the number o f shares held by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year end and the value of 
option is calculated by multiplying the total option delta (using the Black-Scholes (1973)) 
by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year end. Firm debt is the sum o f current and long­
term debt. Firm equity is the product o f shares outstanding and the stock price at the 
firm’s fiscal year end. The second measure is an indicator variable equal to one when the 
CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than one (i.e. the CEO is more levered than the 
firm), and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
CEO compensation incentives. I include additional control variables to proxy for 
CEO compensation incentives that influence corporate cash holdings. Liu and Mauer
(2 0 1 1 ) find a positive relation between vega and cash holdings but no signification 
relation between delta and cash holdings. Following prior literature (for example, Guay, 
1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), I measure CEO 
compensation incentives by the sensitivity o f CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega) 
and the sensitivity o f  CEO wealth to stock price (delta). Following Cassell et al. (2012), I
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construct the ratio o f the vega to delta (CEO vega/delta ratio) to control for the effects of 
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences and corporate cash holdings. I 
adjust the CEO vega/delta ratio by multiplying it by the ratio o f  total CEO equity 
holdings to CEO inside debt to capture the relative importance of the CEO ’s accumulated 
equity holdings . 7
Governance variables. Following prior literature (for example, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007), I control for the impact o f corporate governance on cash holdings. I 
measure the degree o f managerial entrenchment due to takeover protection using the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (GIM INDEX) index. GIM INDEX is the number of 
antitakeover provisions in a firm’s charter and the index varies from zero to 24. As the 
most recent data on antitakeover amendments is 2006, I use the G-Index o f 2006 for my 
sample firms from 2006 to 2008.
Firm-specific control variables. Following prior literature on corporate cash 
holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009), I also include several 
additional control variables to proxy for firm specific factors that may motivate and 
influence corporate cash holdings. These control variables are motivated by the 
transaction and precautionary explanations for corporate cash holdings. Firm size is 
related with the transaction cost motive for cash holdings (Opler et al, 1999). Firm size is 
calculated as the logarithm of total assets. The precautionary motives suggest that firms 
with better investment opportunities hold more cash because adverse shocks and financial 
distress are more costly for them (Opler et al, 1999). I use market-to-book asset ratio, 
computed as the book value o f net assets minus the book value of equity plus the market
7 If CEO equity hold ings are large (sm all), the effect o f  the C E O  vega/delta  ratio is lik ely  to be large 
(sm all).
value o f equity, all divided by the book value o f net assets, to indicate investment 
opportunities. Firms with higher cash flow accumulate more cash, all else equal (Bates et 
al., 2009). I use Cash flow/net assets which is computed as the ratio o f earnings after 
interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book value o f  net 
assets. I include NWC/net assets, computed as the net working capital-to-net assets ratio, 
as net working capital consists o f assets that substitute for cash. Capital expenditures can 
affect corporate cash holdings either from the tradeoff theory or from the financing 
hierarchy theory (Opler et al., 1999). I measure capital expenditures as Capex/net assets 
which are computed as the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets. I 
include leverage as firms will use cash to reduce leverage if debt is sufficiently 
constraining. Leverage is measured as sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets. Bates et al (2009) argue that firms that 
pay dividends are likely to be less risky and have greater access to capital markets and so, 
they tend to hold less cash. I include a dividend dummy which is a dummy variable equal 
to one in years in which a firm pays a common dividend and is zero otherwise to proxy 
for dividends. I employ R&D/sales, the ratio o f research and development expense to 
sales, to measure growth opportunities. I use acquisition activity, the ratio o f  expenditures 
on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets, as Bates et al. (2009) argue that 
acquisitions and capital expenditures would seem to be substitutes.
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Instruments. Following prior literature on CEO inside debt compensation 
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Anantharaman et al., 2011 and Cassell et al., 2012), I
Q
include the following variables as instruments for CEO inside debt holdings: CEO age ; 
Firm age; a dummy variable (Liquidity Constraint) that equals to one if  the firm is facing 
liquidity constraint indicated by negative operating cash flow, and zero otherwise; a 
dummy variable (Tax Status) that equals to one if the firm has favorable tax status 
identified by if the firm has a loss carry-forward, and zero otherwise; maximum state tax 
rate on individual income . 9
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at upper and lower 1 % of the sample distribution to address potential 
problems associated with extreme observations. Panel A o f  Table 1.1 reports descriptive 
statistics. The mean (median) cash is 0.1467 (0.0699). I find that the mean (median) CEO 
debt/equity ratio is 0.280 (0.078). This suggests that CEO equity holdings are larger than 
CEO inside debt holdings for the majority o f  my sample firms. However, the average 
CEO holds more than $5 million in inside debt, suggesting that inside debt holdings are 
nontrivial to my sample CEOs. The CEO to firm debt/equity ratio shows a similar 
distribution with mean (median) values o f 0.684 (0.296).
8 F ollow ing  C assell et al., 2 0 1 2 , I do not include C EO tenure as another instrument sin ce  C EO  age and 
C EO tenure tend to be h ighly correlated.
9 I co llec t the information for the state tax rates from http://w w w .n ber.org /-taxsim /state-rates/. T hese tax 
rates are calculated using TA X S1M  m odel (Feenberg and C outts, 1993).
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Table 1.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N M ean Std.D ev P25 M edian P75
Cash holdings 1859 0.1467 0.2318 0.0253 0.0699 0.1751
CEO inside debt holdings ($ M illions) 1859 5.8810 11.9230 0.0350 1.4830 6.7330
CEO debt/equity ratio ($ M illions) 1859 0.2800 0.5520 0.0010 0.0780 0.3158
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 1859 0.6840 1.0710 0.0050 0.2960 0.9560
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio >1 1859 0.2399 0.4271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CEO age 1848 56.088 6.9370 52.0000 56.0000 60.0000
CEO tenure 1859 8.2120 6.7170 3.0000 6.0000 11.0000
Firm size 1859 7.6860 1.4520 6.6490 7.5820 8.6510
Dividend dummy 1859 0.5760 0.4940 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
M arket-to-book ratio 1859 2.1970 2.1310 1.1870 1.5930 2.2190
Cash flow/Net assets 1859 0.0920 0.1470 0.0570 0.0960 0.1430
N W C /N et assets 1859 0.0780 0.1980 -0.0190 0.0880 0.1890
C apex/N et assets 1859 0.0636 0.0652 0.0246 0.0431 0.0771
Leverage 1859 0.2099 0.1446 0.1022 0.1978 0.2989
R& D /Sales 1859 0.0510 0.1030 0.0000 0.0020 0.0490
Acquisition Activity 1859 0.0340 0.0770 0.0000 0.0010 0.3020
GIM  Index 1144 9.1200 2.6510 7.0000 9.0000 11.0000
CEO  V ega/D elta ratio 1859 0.3135 0.3659 0.0714 0.2098 0.4763
Panel B: Sample distribution by industry
Tw o-digit SIC Frequency Percent
20 Food and Kindred Products 74 3.98
26 Paper and A llied Products 49 2.64
27 Printing and Publishing 38 2.04
28 C hem icals & Allied Products 177 9.52
33 Prim ary M etal Industries 42 2.26
35 Industrial & Com m ercial M achinery&  C om puter Equip. 
Electronic & O ther Electrical Equip. & C om ponents Except
147 7.91
36 C om puter Equip. 137 7.37
37 Transportation Equip.
M easuring A nalyzing C ontrolling Inst.; Photographic M edical
62 3.34
38 & Optical Goods 136 7.32
48 Com m unications 39 2.10
50 W holesale Trade- Durable G oods 58 3.12
58 Eating and Drinking Places 43 2.31
59 M iscellaneous Retail 45 2.42
73 Business Services 143 7.69
Industries with less than 2% o f  sam ple representation 669 35.99
Total 1,859 100.00
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Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Variables include the 
ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities (Cash), the sum of the present value o f accumulated 
pension benefits and deferred compensation (CEO inside debt holdings), the natural log 
o f one plus the ratio o f CEO ’s debt-to-equity ratio (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio), a 
dummy variable that equals one if  CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and 
zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l), the ratio of CEO vega to the delta 
(CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm of net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f  the 
book value o f net assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value o f equity to 
the book value o f net assets (Market-to-book), the ratio of earnings after interest, 
dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book value o f  net assets (Cash 
flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets (NWC/assets), the ratio of 
capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term 
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the book value of net assets (Leverage), a 
dummy variable that equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in 
a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f  research and development 
expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value 
o f net assets (Acquisition activity), the number o f years since the first year that the firm is 
reported in Compustat (Firm age), the number o f years the executive has served as CEO 
(CEO tenure), a dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is also the chairman o f the 
board (Duality), the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm’s charter as reported 
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and varies from zero to 
24 (GIM Index). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in Appendix A. Data
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are obtained from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, EXECUCOMP, and IRRC and consist o f 1,859 
firm-year observations from 2006 to 2008. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Panel B 
reports the sample distribution by industry. Panel C reports pairwise correlation of 
primary variables. Correlations significant at 5% or better are marked with stars.
The mean (median) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> 1 is 0.2399 (0.0000) indicating 
that CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio is less than firm’s debt-to-equity ratio for the majority of 
my sample firms.
Panel B o f Table 1.1 reports the industry classification (by two-digit SIC codes) 
across my sample. My sample firms are from a broad spectrum of industries.
Panel C o f Table 1.1 reports Pearson correlations for my variables o f  interest and 
our primary dependent variables. Interestingly, I find a negative and significant relation 
between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt holdings. I find a positive but 
insignificant relation between CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and firm cash holdings while 
I find a negative but insignificant relation between CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l and 
firm cash holdings.
Methodology
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings 
in this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions of cash holdings on CEO 
inside debt compensation.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Cash Holdings
To examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash 
holdings, I regress cash holdings on CEO inside debt compensation and controls with 
controls for industry (2-digit SIC code dummies) and year (year dummies) fixed effect.
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Following Liu and Mauer (2011), first examine the contemporaneous relation between 
cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. The Model One test is as shown below: 
CASHn = (x + /?/ (CEO inside debt compensation),, + (h (controls),, t (h £ ( 2  -  
d ig it  SIC d u m m y  va ria b les), + fiy YX year d u m m y  va ria b les), + e„
Next, following prior studies on corporate cash holdings (Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell, 2008 and Liu and Mauer, 2011), I examine the relation between cash holdings 
and lagged CEO compensation incentives to control for potential endogeneity of 
compensation incentives. The Model One test is as shown below:
CASHu = a + Pi * (CEO inside debt compensation), + fit, (controls)i t_i + fj, 
X(2 -  d ig it  SIC d u m m y  v a r ia b le s ), + f)y Y,{.ysar d u m m y  v a r ia b le s ) , + Eit
I use two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS) to control for the endogeneity of 
compensation incentives. In the first-stage, I separately regress CEO compensation 
incentives on all o f the variables along with the instruments. In the second-stage, CEO 
compensation incentives are replaced by their predicted values from their respective first- 
stage regressions.
After examining the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash holdings, I 
next examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive valuation effect for 
firms with lower CEO inside debt. Following Pinkowitz, Stulz, and W illiamson (2006), I 
use a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) valuation regression. Prior studies 
in corporate cash holdings use this valuation regression and it is a total firm value 
approach which yields a net value o f cash that combines the assessments o f both 
shareholders and debtholders.
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Empirical Results
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on firm cash holdings in 
this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions o f  firm cash holdings on CEO 
inside debt compensation. I then report results o f a Fama and French (1998) valuation 
regression to examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive (negative) 
valuation effect for firms with higher CEO to firm debt/equity ratio.
I begin by examining the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on firm cash 
holdings. Following Liu and Mauer (2011), I first examine the contemporaneous relation 
between cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives, where firm cash holdings and 
all independent variables are measured at time t. Table 1.2 reports the results of 
multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and 
Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first 
measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and 
Four include the alternative measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio> 1 .
Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Firm Cash Floldings
Table 1.2
Contemporaneous Regressions o f  Cash Holdings on CEO Inside Debt Holdings
(1) (2)__________(3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 0.0057 *** 0.0035 *** 
(3.8800) (3.43)
Market-to-book ratio
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> 1
Firm Size -0.071 ***
(-13.11) 
0.073 ***
(13.44)
0.037*** 0.029 *** 
(4.80) (4.97)
-0.073 *** 
(-8.45) 
0.075 *** 
(15.31)
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Table 1.2 (Continued)
Cash flow/Net Assets -0.027 -0.023
(-0.37) (-0.45)
NWC/Net Assets -0.334 *** -0.325 ***
(-6.18) (-5.79)
Capex/Net Assets -0.103 -0.115
(-0.87) (-0.75)
Leverage -0.017 -0.023
(-0.48) (-0.57)
R&D/Sales 1.357 *** 1.413 ***
(11.67) (10.54)
Dividend Dummy -0.014 -0.017
(-1.38) (-1.61)
Acquisition Activity -0.319 *** -0.327 ***
(-6.67) (-6.98)
GIM Index -0.004 * -0.005 *
(-1.77) (-1.83)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.0013 ** 0.0015 **
(2.40) (2.27)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N
Adj. R2
1859 1144 
0.49 0.51
1859
0.50
1144
0.52
Table 1.2 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash 
holdings in contemporaneous specification where cash and all independent variables are 
measured at time t. All models control for industry and year fixed effect, where industry 
is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The dependent variable is 
the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The two main independent variables are 
two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a 
dummy variable with a value o f one if  CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one 
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio of 
CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm
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Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the 
market value o f  equity to the book value o f net assets (Market-to-book), the ratio of 
earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book 
value o f  net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets 
(NWC/assets), the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets 
(Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the 
book value of net assets (Leverage), a dummy variable that equals one if  regular cash 
dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy), 
the ratio o f research and development expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio of 
expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets (Acquisition activity), GIM 
Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm’s charter as reported by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and the index varies from zero 
to 24, and CEO vega/delta ratio. Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in 
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. Models One and Two report results where 
the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results where the main 
explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and 
*** indicate levels o f significance o f  10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are positive and 
significant in Models One and Two. This supports Hi, which predicts that cash holdings 
are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings. My conclusions are unchanged using an 
alternative proxy for inside debt in Models Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on
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CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are positive and significant. I continue to find support for ///. 
The firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
While studying the effect o f corporate governance on firm cash holdings, Harford, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) lag their governance variables and argue that lagging helps 
control for potential endogeneity o f  governance. Liu and Mauer (2011) report the results 
o f the relation between cash holdings and lagged CEO compensation incentives. To 
control for potential endogeneity o f  compensation incentives, I next examine the effect of 
lagged CEO inside debt compensation on firm cash holdings. Table 1.3 reports the results 
o f multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One 
and Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first 
measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and 
Four include the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio> 1 .
Table 1.3
Lagged Regressions o f  Cash Holdings on CEO Inside Debt Holdings
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 0.0062 *** 0.0049 ***
(3.39) (2.84)
CEO to firm debt/equity * * * * * *
ratio> 1 0.047 0.027
(4.79) (3.47)
Firm Size -0.073 *** -0.076 ***
(-12.58) ( - 1 0 .6 6 )
Market-to-book ratio 0.078 * * * 0.081 ***
(9.63) (11.78)
Cash flow/Net Assets -0.057 -0.075
(-1.05) (-1.59)
NWC/Net Assets -0.461 * * * -0.491 ***
(-8.57) (-7.42)
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Table 1.3 (Continued)
Capex/Net Assets -0.138 -0.157
(-0.92) (-1.56)
Leverage -0.105 -0.113
(-0.98) (-0.81)
R&D/Sales 1.973 *** 1 9 9 5  ***
(7.67) (8.13)
Dividend Dummy -0.023 -0.027
(-1.45) (-1.26)
GIM Index -0 .0 0 1 * -0.003 *
(-1.71) (-1.87)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.0009 ** 0.0013 **
(1.99) (2.32)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 1832 1 1 1 0 1832 1 1 1 0
Adj. R2 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.42
Table 1.3 reports results o f the effect o f  CEO inside debt holdings on cash 
holdings in lagged specification where cash is measured at time t+1 and all independent 
variables are measured at time t. All models control for industry and year fixed effect, 
where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The 
dependent variable is the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net 
assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The two main 
independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity 
ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control 
variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural 
logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus the 
book value o f equity plus the market value of equity to the book value o f  net assets 
(Market-to-book), the ratio of earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before
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depreciation divided by the book value of net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f  net 
working capital to net assets (NWC/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book 
value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dummy variable that 
equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year 
(Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and development expense to sales 
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets 
(Acquisition activity), GIM Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s 
charter as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and 
the index varies from zero to 24, and CEO vega/delta ratio. Detailed definitions o f all 
variables are reported in Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. Models One and 
Two report results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f CEO inside 
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings 
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /'-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are positive and 
significant in Models One and Two. This supports / / / ,  which predicts that cash holdings 
are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings. My conclusions are unchanged using an 
alternative proxy for inside debt in Models Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on 
CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are positive and significant. I continue to find support for ///. 
The firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
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Effect o f Pension and Deferred Compensation on 
Firm Cash Holdings
Next, I examine which component o f CEO inside debt compensation primarily 
drives the positive relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash 
holdings. I partition the CEO inside debt compensation into pension and deferred 
compensation to examine the effect o f these components o f  CEO inside debt 
compensation on firm cash holdings. Table 1.4 reports the results o f multivariate 
regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and Two report 
results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the pension scaled by 
total compensation, measured as the sum of CEO inside debt holdings and equity 
holdings. Models Three and Four include the other component o f  CEO inside debt 
holdings: deferred compensation scaled by total compensation and total compensation is 
the sum of CEO inside debt holdings and equity holdings.
Table 1.4
The Effect o f  Pension and Deferred Compensation on Firm Cash Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Pension 0.029 0.022
(1.17) (1.43)
CEO Deferred Compensation 0.068 * 0.061 *
(1.83) (1.77)
Firm Size -0.073 *** -0.075 ***
(-15.27) (-15.85)
Market-to-book ratio 0.077 *** 0.079 ***
(12.34) (12.58)
Cash flow/Net Assets -0.032 -0.033
(-0.37) (-0.41)
NWC/Net Assets -0.311 *** -0.314 ***
(-5.51) (-5.87)
Capex/Net Assets -0.085 -0.087
(-0.71) (-0.79)
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Leverage -0.019 -0 . 0 2 1
(-0.53) (-0.65)
R&D/Sales 1.427 *** 1.435
(9.23) (9.57)
Dividend Dummy -0.005 -0.008
(-1.07) (-1.19)
GIM Index -0.003 * -0.004*
(-1.74) (-1.87)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.0019 *** 0.0023
(3.43) (3.76)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 2312 1590 2312 1590
Adj. R2 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.58
Table 1.4 reports results o f the effect o f two components o f  CEO inside debt 
holdings: pension and deferred compensation on cash holdings. All models control for 
industry and year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 
industry classification. The dependent variable is the ratio of cash plus marketable 
securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities (Cash). The two main independent variables are: Pension and Deferred 
compensation and they are scaled by the sum o f CEO inside debt and equity holdings. 
Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the 
natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus 
the book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the book value o f  net assets 
(Market-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before 
depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f  net 
working capital to net assets (NWC/assets), the ratio of capital expenditures to the book 
value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum of long-term debt and debt in current
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liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dummy variable that 
equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year 
(Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and development expense to sales 
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f  expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets 
(Acquisition activity), GIM Index, the number o f  antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s 
charter as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and 
the index varies from zero to 24. Detailed definitions o f  all variables are reported in 
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. Models One and Two report results where 
the main explanatory variable is pension while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is deferred compensation. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f  significance o f  10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on both pension and deferred compensation are 
positive. However, the estimated coefficients on deferred compensation are significant. In 
summary, results from Table 1.4 suggest that deferred compensation is the driving 
channel behind the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt 
holdings.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt and Equity Compensation 
Incentives on Firm Cash Holdings
My finding that a positive relation exists between CEO inside debt holdings and 
firm cash holdings mimics the findings in Liu and Mauer (2011), who find a positive 
relation between firm cash holdings and the vega o f a CEO’s equity compensation. 
Therefore, one can interpret that a positive relation exits between CEO debt and equity 
compensation and firm cash holdings. In their paper, Liu and Mauer (2011) argue that
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debtholders anticipate the risk-shifting incentives associated with vega and therefore 
require high vega firms to hold greater cash holdings to protect their interests. CEO 
inside debt compensation reduces agency cost o f debt by aligning the interests o f CEO 
with those o f debtholders. I find a positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings 
and cash holdings and this may be due to the fact that inside debt reduces the CEOs risk- 
taking incentives. In this section, I examine whether the significant positive relation CEO 
inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings still remain after including vega o f a 
CEO’s equity compensation as a control variable.
Table 1.5 investigates these separate effects by including inside debt and vega in 
the cash regression. Positive coefficients on inside debt and vega suggest that both 
channels have a direct effect on cash balances. Model One includes the first measure of 
inside debt holdings and vega while Model Two includes the second measure o f CEO 
inside debt holdings and vega, respectively. As seen in Model One, the first measure of 
CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and vega are significantly 
positively related to cash. Again in Model Two, both the second measure o f CEO inside 
debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l and vega are significantly positively 
related to firm cash holdings. Overall, results in Table 1.5 confirm my main findings that 
the positive effect o f inside debt on cash holdings is distinct from the effect o f  vega o f a 
CEO’s equity compensation on firm cash holdings.
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Table 1.5
The Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Compensation and Vega on Firm Cash Holdings
( 1 ) (2 )
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 0.0023 *** 
(2.97)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l 0.014***
(3.44)
CEO Vega 0.213** 0.234**
(2.49) (2.31)
Firm Size -0.072*** -0.074***
(-12.17) ( - 1 0 . 1 1 )
Market-to-book ratio 0.067*** 0.071 ***
(13.63) (14.92)
Cash flow/Net Assets -0.055 -0.078
(-1.23) (-1.58)
NWC/Net Assets -0.389*** -0.412***
(-7.22) (-6 .6 6 )
Capex/Net Assets - 0.111 -0 . 1 2 1
(-1.37) (-0.98)
Leverage -0 . 0 1 1 -0.019
(-0.67) (-0.78)
R&D/Sales 1.062*** 1 091 ***
(10.98) (11.34)
Dividend Dummy -0.009 -0 . 0 1 2
(-0.93) (-1.51)
Acquisition Activity -0.281 *** -0.297***
(-6.45) (-6.76)
GIM Index -0 . 0 0 2  * -0.003 *
(- 1 .8 6 ) (-1.79)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES
N 1144 1144
Adj. R2 0.54 0.53
Table 1.5 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings and vega on 
cash holdings. All models control for industry and year fixed effect, where industry is 
defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The dependent variable is 
the ratio o f  cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets
36
minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The three main independent variables are 
two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a 
dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one 
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l), the sensitivity o f  the value o f the 
CEO’s accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the volatility 
o f  stock prices (Vega). Control variables are the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm 
Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the 
market value o f  equity to the book value o f net assets (Market-to-book), the ratio of 
earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book 
value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f  net working capital to net assets 
(NWC/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets 
(Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the 
book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dummy variable that equals one if  regular cash 
dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy), 
the ratio o f research and development expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio of 
expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets (Acquisition activity), GIM 
Index, the number of antitakeover provisions in the firm’s charter as reported by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and the index varies from zero 
to 24. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A. Sample period is 
2006 - 2008. Models One and Two report results where the main explanatory variables 
are the first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) and 
Vega while Models Three and Four report results where the main explanatory variables 
are the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l)
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and Vega. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate 
levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Firm Cash Holdings 
for Firms Facing Financial Constraints
CEOs may face constraints in their ability to hold excess cash. Financial 
constraint status o f the firm is one o f the constraining factor and the relation between 
CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings could depend on whether a firm is 
financially constrained. CEOs o f a financially constrained firms may face difficulty 
accumulating excess cash as their inside debt compensation goes up as capital is limited. 
This implies that the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt 
compensation may be mitigated by financial constraint status o f the firm.
To examine whether financial constraints influence the relation between CEO 
inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings, I interact CEO inside debt 
compensation with variables that proxy for the degree to which a firm is financially 
constrained. Negative coefficients on these interaction terms indicate that the positive 
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings is smaller for 
financially constrained firms than for financially unconstrained firms.
Following prior literature, I construct a number o f  financial constraint proxies. 
Small firms are less likely than large firms to have access to external funds and based on 
this argument Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) utilize firm size as a proxy for financial 
constraint status o f  the firm. Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) argue that firms with 
large amounts o f growth options and few assets in place generate less internal funds and 
they face difficulty funding their growth options with external funds. Based on this 
argument Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) utilize the market-to-book ratio as a
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proxy for financial constraint. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) use dividend payout 
to proxy for financial constraint status o f  the firm as it suggests that low dividend payout 
firms have insufficient internal cash flow to fund investments and so, these firms have to 
rely on external funds.
Following Liu and Mauer (2011), I use two different dummy variables for small 
firm size (SMALLSALES and SMALLNA). SMALLSALES is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm’s sales in below the sample median and zero otherwise whereas 
SMALLNA is a dummy variable equal to one if  a firm’s net assets (total assets minus 
cash plus marketable securities) is below the sample median and zero otherwise. I use a 
dummy variable HIGHMB for high market-to-book ratio and HIGHMB is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm’s market to book ratio is above the sample median and 
zero otherwise. Finally, I use a dummy variable LOWPAYOUT to proxy for whether a 
firm has low dividend payout. LOWPAYOUT is a dummy variable equal to one if  the 
firm’s payout ratio is below the sample median and zero otherwise. Payout ratio o f a firm 
is measured as the ratio o f common dividends plus share repurchases to earnings.
Table 1.6 reports regression results in which I interact the measure o f  CEO inside 
debt: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio with two different dummy variables for small firm 
size (SMALLSALES and SMALLNA) in Models One and Two, a dummy variable for 
high market-to-book (HIGHMB) in Model Three, and a dummy variable for whether the 
firm has low payouts (LOWPAYOUT) in Model Four. I exclude the continuous variable 
firm size as a control in Models One and Two as I use two proxies for size to measure 
financial constraints while in Model Three, I exclude the continuous variable market-to- 
book as a control because I use market-to-book to proxy for financial constraint.
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Table 1.6
Regressions o f  Cash Holdings on Inside Debt fo r  Financially Constrained Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 0.0041 *  *  * 0.0052 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0077 ***
(2.97) (3.41) (3.29) (3.07)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x -0.085 * * *
SMALLSALES
(-3.11)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x -0.091 ***
SMALLNA
(-2.68)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x -0.107 ***
HIGHMB
(-3.47)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x -0.063 *
LOWPAYOUT
(-1.69)
Firm Size -0.069 *** -0.070 ***
(-10.73) (-9.67)
Market-to-book ratio 0.067 * * * 0.065 *** 0.063 ***
(12.77) (15.37) (13.46)
Cash flow/Net Assets -0.013 -0.019 -0.021
(-1.35) (-1.09) (-1.61)
NWC/Net Assets -0.403 * * * -0.391 *** -0.363 ***
(-7.56) (-6.29) (-6.87)
Capex/Net Assets -0.089 -0.117 -0.109
(-1.57) (-1.31) (-1.49)
Leverage -0.009 -0.011 -0.007
(-0.78) (-0.29) (-0.62)
R&D/Sales 1.079 * * * 1.098 *** 1.103 ***
(10.50) (12.56) (9.84)
Dividend Dummy -0.008 -0.010 -0.009
(-0.97) (-1.04) (-1.32)
Acquisition Activity -0.298 *** -0.301 *** -0.312 ***
(-5.78) (-6.79) (-6.54)
GIM Index -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.004 *
(-1.67) (-1.93) (-1.89)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 1144 1144 1144 1144
Adj. R2 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.53
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Table 1.6 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash 
holdings for financially constrained firms. All models control for industry and year fixed 
effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. 
The dependent variable is the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where 
net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The main 
independent variable is the measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio. In Models (1) and (2) I exclude the continuous variable firm size as a 
control as I use two proxies for size to measure financial constraints and in Model Three. 
I exclude the continuous variable market-to-book as a control because I use market-to- 
book to proxy for financial constraint. SMALLSALES is a dummy variable equal to one 
if  a firm’s sales is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. SMALLNA is a dummy 
variable equal to one if  a firm’s net assets (total assets minus cash plus marketable 
securities) is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. HIGHMB is a dummy 
variable equal to one if  the firm’s market-to-book ratio is above the sample median, and 
zero otherwise. LOWPAYOUT is a dummy variable equal to one if  the firm ’s payout 
ratio is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. The payout ratio in a given year is 
calculated as the ratio o f common dividends plus share repurchases to earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. Control 
variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural 
logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus the 
book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the book value o f  net assets 
(Market-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before 
depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f  net
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working capital to net assets (NWC/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book 
value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dummy variable that 
equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year 
(Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and development expense to sales 
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f  expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets 
(Acquisition activity), GIM Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm’s 
charter as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and 
the index varies from zero to 24. Detailed definitions o f  all variables are reported in 
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
Results in the Table 1.6 indicate that the coefficients on inside debt interacted 
with the financial constraint proxies are all negative and significant consistent with the 
predicted effect o f financial constraints. However, the coefficient on the interaction with 
LOWPAYOUT is negative but not statistically significant. Interestingly, the magnitudes 
o f  the coefficients on the interaction terms are large enough so that they are able to offset 
the positive effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on cash. In summary, findings in the 
Table 1.6 indicate that financial constraint status of a firm can entirely offset the 
incentive o f CEOs with inside debt compensation to build excess cash reserves in a firm.
Endogeneity Concern 
My multivariate analysis is based on OLS regression. My analysis assumes that 
CEO inside debt compensation is exogenous whereas CEO inside debt compensation
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could be determined endogenously with firm cash holding policy. The possibility that 
CEO inside debt compensation is endogenous gives rise to two related concerns. First, 
the model specification suffers an omitted variable bias and consequently, the model does 
not capture all determinants o f firm cash holding policy and there are unobserved firm- 
specific and CEO-specific characteristics that influence both firm cash policy and CEO 
inside debt compensation. Second, the direction o f causality between CEO inside debt 
compensation and firm cash policy is hard to conclude. It is possible that changes in cash 
holding policy change firm value which requires the adjustment in CEO inside debt 
compensation. This imply that the contemporaneous relation between CEO inside debt 
compensation and firm cash holdings is subject to the concern that changes in firm cash 
policy lead to changes in CEO inside debt compensation. By estimating the impact of 
CEO inside debt holdings on future firm cash holdings, I attempt to control for the 
potential endogeneity that exists between CEO compensation structure and firm cash 
policy.
As further sensitivity tests, I estimate my models using a two-stage least-squares 
framework to explicitly account for endogeneity issue. In the first stage, I separately 
regress CEO inside debt holdings on all o f the independent variables along with the 
instruments. The second stage then utilizes the predicted value o f CEO inside debt 
holdings from the first stage. Following prior literature on CEO inside debt compensation 
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Anantharaman et al., 2011 and Cassell et ah, 2012), I 
include the following variables as instruments for CEO inside debt holdings: CEO age10; 
Firm age; a dummy variable (Liquidity Constraint) that equals to one if  the firm is facing
10 F o llow ing  C assell et al., 2 012 , 1 do not include C EO  tenure as another instrument sin ce  C EO  age and 
C EO tenure tend to be h ighly correlated.
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liquidity constraint indicated by negative operating cash flow, and zero otherwise; a 
dummy variable (Tax Status) that equals to one if  the firm has favorable tax status 
identified by if the firm has a loss carry-forward, and zero otherwise; maximum state tax 
rate on individual income. These rates are calculated using the TAXSIM model 
(Feenberg and Coutts, 1993), and were obtained from http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state- 
rates/.
Table 1.7 reports the second-stage regression in which CEO inside debt holding is 
replaced by its predicted value from its respective first-stage regression. Models One and 
Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the 
predicted values o f  first measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity 
ratio. Models Three and Four include the predicted values o f  alternative measure o f CEO 
inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l. The estimated coefficients on 
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are positive and significant in Models One and Two. This 
supports Hi, which predicts that firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt 
holdings. My conclusions remain unchanged using the predicted values o f  the alternative 
proxy for CEO inside debt in Models Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on CEO 
to firm debt/equity >1 are positive and significant. Overall, results from two-stage least- 
squares framework suggest that the firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt 
holdings.
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Table 1.7
2SLS Regressions o f  Cash Holdings on CEO Inside Debt Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 0.067 *** 
(5.54)
0.043
(4.88)
* * *
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l 0.177 *** 
(6.39)
0.139
(4.57)
* *
Firm Size -0.075
(-13.89)
*** -0.077
(-11.37)
* * *
Market-to-book ratio 0.087
(11.23)
* * * 0.089
(12.96)
***
Cash flow/Net Assets -0.017
(-0.59)
-0.019
(-0.86)
NWC/Net Assets -0.351
(-5.71)
*** -0.373
(-6.34)
***
Capex/Net Assets -0.083
(-0.74)
-0.087
(-1.03)
Leverage -0.029
(-0.93)
-0.031
(-0.86)
R&D/Sales 1.295
(9.13)
* * * 1.324
(9.35)
***
Dividend Dummy -0.017
(-1.44)
-0.024
(-1.35)
GIM Index -0.0007
(-1.78)
* -0.0009
(-1.82)
*
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.057
(2.17)
** 0.063
(2.35)
**
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 1716 1006 1716 1006
Adj. R2 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.55
Table 1.7 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash 
holdings in two stage least square where in the first stage CEO inside debt holdings are 
regressed on all independent variables plus instruments and in the second stage cash is 
regressed on the predicted values o f CEO inside debt compensation. All models control 
for industry and year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French
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49 industry classification. The dependent variable is the ratio o f cash plus marketable 
securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities (Cash). The two main independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO 
inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value 
o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO 
Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f  the book 
value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the 
book value o f net assets (Market-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends 
and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash 
flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets (NWC/assets), the ratio of 
capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term 
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the book value of net assets (Leverage), a 
dummy variable that equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in 
a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f  research and development 
expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value 
o f net assets (Acquisition activity). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in 
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. Models One and Two report results where 
the main explanatory variable is the predicted value of the first measure o f  CEO inside 
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is the predicted value o f  the second measure o f  CEO 
inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in
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parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f  significance o f 10%, 5%, and 
1 %, respectively.
Effect o f  Cash Increases (Decreases) on Valuation Effect 
for Firms with Lower CEO to Firm 
Debt/Equity Ratio
I now examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive (negative) 
valuation effect for firms with lower CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. I employ the Fama 
and French (1998) valuation regression. This regression has been used in many studies 
examining valuation effects and is well suited for my purpose as it accounts for cross- 
section variations in firm value. This total firm value regression approach has been used 
in many studies examining valuation effect. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) use this 
model to analyze the determinants o f the value o f  cash for domestic firms. Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2003) use this model to investigate the valuation effect o f  cash 
and dividends for firms in countries with different level o f  investor protection. Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use this model to show that cash is worth less when agency 
problems between insiders and outsiders are greater. Brockman and Unlu (2009) use this 
model to test whether dividend reductions (increases) are value increasing (decreasing) 
for firms in countries with poor creditor rights. Following Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2006), I use the modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) valuation 
regression by replacing the two year change in value of variables by one year change in 
value of variables. The basic regression specification is as follows:
Vi,t = P0 + P i E i<t+ M E i i t+ p 3d E i t + 1 + p 4dAj  t + p 5d A iit+1 + P 6 R D i t + p 7d R D i t  
+ p a d R D j t + 1 + p 9l ( t + P i o d f i t  + P11dlift+1 + P 12Dii t+  p 13d D j t
+ p 14dDj  t+1 + P15Q t + p 16dCj t + p 17d C j t+1 + p 18dVj t+1 + £j t
( 1 . 1 )
Al
In the above equation (1.1), all variables are scaled by total assets to control for 
heteroskedasticity (see Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003; and Brockman and Unlu,
2009). Xt is the level o f variable X in fiscal year t scaled by total assets in year t. dXt is 
the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets in year t 
((Xt -  Xt_1) /A t). dXt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year t+1 scaled by 
total assets in year t ((Xt+1 -  Xt) /A t). Firm value is measured by the market value o f  the 
firm, which is calculated as the sum o f market value o f equity and total liabilities at fiscal 
year end. The independent variables include earnings (E), total assets (A), research and 
development expenditures (RD), interest expense (I), common dividends (D), cash plus 
marketable securities (C), and total value o f the firm value for year t+1 (Vt+1). Earnings 
are calculated as earnings before extraordinary items, plus interest expense, plus income 
statement deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available). A is the book value of 
total assets. RD is R&D expenditures and is set to zero when missing. I is the interest 
expense. D is the cash dividends paid to common stock. V is firm’s common stock price 
multiply shares outstanding at the end o f fiscal year, plus preferred stock, plus total book 
liabilities, minus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit ( if  available), 
where preferred stock is taken to be, in order and as available, redemption value, 
liquidating value, or par value. Notice that this model includes next-period variables to 
absorb changes in expectations. The primary variable o f  interest in my study is the 
contemporaneous relation between firm value and cash plus marketable securities (Cj t). 
This directly measures the valuation effect o f current cash plus marketable securities on 
firm.
48
Table 1.8 reports the results using a modified version o f the Fama and French 
(1998) valuation regression model. I allow the coefficient estimates and intercept to vary 
with inside debt in order to estimate how cash plus marketable securities have a different 
valuation effect for firms with different levels of inside debt. More specifically, in each 
fiscal year, I create a dummy variable with a value o f one for firms with a CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio above median and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is further 
interacted with all the independent variables as well as the constant. Therefore, the 
coefficient estimates on the interaction term are the additional valuation effect o f cash for 
firms with relative inside debt ratio above median. Cash increases should generate more 
value for firms with lower relative inside debt ratio. Following Fama and French (1998), I 
estimate the equation using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology. Models One and 
Two do not include induce industry effects, while Model Three and Four include industry 
effects.
Table 1.8
CEO Inside Debt Compensation and Cash Valuations
( 1 ) (2 )
L ow  inside 
debt
High inside  
debt
T -statistics o f  
difference
Low  inside  
debt
H igh inside  
debt
T -statistics
o f
d ifference
E, 4.39 *** 5.96 *** 3.14 * 4 89 *** 6.31 *** 2.04
(5.85) (7.77) (7.45) (7.79)
dE, -0.69 *** -1.23 * * * -0.59 -0 89 *** -0 49 *** -0.39
(-8 . 1 1 ) (-8.41) (-12.67) (-12.48)
dE,+/ 2.63 *** 2.71 * * * 0.14 2.56 *** 2  7 9  * * * 0.65
(6.19) (6.73) (7.57) (7.76)
dA, -0.13 -0.17 -0.24 -0.14 -0 . 1 0 0.03
(-1.15) (-1.39) (-0.81) (-1.09)
dA t+i 0.55 0.34 -0.51 0.46 0.35 -0.33
(1.13) (1.51) (1.45) (1.27)
RD, 2.23 1.13 - 1 . 1 0 2.67 2.09 - 1 . 1 0
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Table 1.8 (Continued)
(1.17) (1.58) (1.17) (1.55)
dRD, -1.45 0.59 * 3.25 * -1.87 -0.65 0.43
(-0.99) (1.91) (-1.43) (-1.58)
dRD,+1 3.21 ** 4.57 ** 4.35 * 3.47 ** 4.11 ** 3.63 *
(2.39) (2.45) (2.17) (2.46)
I, -11.88 ** -10.83 ** 1.47 -12.11 ** -9.09 ** 3.31 *
(-2.20) (-2.31) (-2.41) (-2.28)
dl, 5.65 2.79 -0.34 7.16* 3.39 * -0.39
(1.57) (1.45) (1.86) (1.92)
dl,+i 1.87 5.03* 3.99 * 3.17 3.76 0.13
(1.05) (1.75) (1.46) (1.49)
Dt 3.57* 10.11 *** 6.57 ** 3.67 ** 7.47 * * * 3.49 *
(1.73) (11.35) (2.37) (9.56)
dD, -2.49 -3.17 -0.17 -2.52 -2.67 -0.06
(-1.57) (-1.09) (-1.59) (-1.22)
dD ,n -1.47 1.67 * 4.01 * -1.78 -3.67 0.45
(-1.03) (1.87) (-1.35) (-1.46)
Ct 9.58 *** 4.56 *** -5.18 ** 9.78 *** 5.52 * * * -3.78 *
(11.19) (3.68) (9.77) (8.32)
dC, 3.25 1.77 -2.17 3.13 1.98 -2.06
(1.25) (1.11) (1.60) (1.12)
dCt+i 1.94* 1.36 4.01 * 1.99 1.78 -0.67
(1.78) (1.16) (1.22) (1.29)
dV,+i -0.36 -0.55 -2.46 -0.24 -0.49 -2.38
(-1.24) (-1.49) (-1.07) (-1.47)
Constant 1.55 *** 1.33 *** -13.50 * * * 1.67 *** 1.23 * * * -3.79 *
(18.79) (14.73) (10.57) (9.77)
Industry
fixed effect No YES
N 1756 1756
r2 0.51 0.6011
Table 1.8 presents the regression results o f  cash valuation effect for firms with 
different level o f CEO to firm debt/equity ratio using Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
methodology. Sample period is 2006-2008. Due to data limitation on Compustat, sample 
size is reduced to 1,756 firm-year observations. Model One does not include industry 
fixed effect. Model Two includes industry fixed effect. Industry is defined based on Fama
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and French 49 industry classification. X t is the level o f variable X  in fiscal year t scaled 
by total assets in year t. dX t is the change in variable X from year t- l  to year t scaled by 
total assets in year t ((Xt -  dX t+1 is the change in variable X from year t to
year t+1 scaled by total assets in year t ((Xt+1 -  Xt) / A t ). The independent variables 
include earnings (E), total assets (A), research and development expenditures (RD), 
interest expense (I), common dividends (D), cash plus marketable securities (C), and total 
value o f the firm value for year t+1 (Ft+1). Earnings is calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items, plus interest expense, plus income statement deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (if available). A is the book value o f total assets. RD  is R&D  
expenditures and is set to zero when missing. I  is the interest expense. D  is the cash 
dividends paid to common stock. V is the market value of the firm calculated by 
multiplying firm’s common stock price by shares outstanding at the end o f fiscal year, 
plus preferred stock, plus total book liabilities, minus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (if available), where preferred stock is taken to be, in order and as 
available, redemption value, liquidating value, or par value. The /-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f  10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficient for low inside debt firms in Model One is positive and 
significant (9.58). While the estimated coefficient for high inside debt firms is also 
positive and significant (4.56) in Model One, the positive valuation effect is significantly 
greater for low inside debt firms relative to high inside debt firms. My results are similar 
in Model Two which includes firm fixed effects. Overall, my results suggest that cash
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changes have a more positive valuation effect for firms with lower level o f inside debt 
than firms with a higher level o f  inside debt.
Conclusion
In this essay, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on firms’ 
cash holdings. CEO inside debt compensation mitigates the agency conflicts between 
debtholders and shareholders by aligning the interests o f CEOs with those o f debtholders. 
Two components o f CEO inside debt compensation: pension and deferred compensation 
may mitigate agency conflicts between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and 
Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, 
Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). In the language o f  Jensen and Meckling (1976), “inside debt” 
represents a fixed obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, 
inside debt is typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured 
and unfunded nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and 
insolvency treatment as outside debt holders. This aligns managers with debt holders and 
may cause managers to manage their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Edmans and Liu, 2011).
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside 
debt are associated with less risky investment and financial policies. CEOs with higher 
inside debt may prefer to invest in cash as cash holdings are less risky projects (Tong,
2010). Therefore, based on risk-aversion hypothesis, I posit a positive relation between 
CEO inside debt holdings and corporate cash holdings. Conversely, CEOs with debt-like 
compensation bear a lower cost o f borrowing (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2010). 
This provides firms with easier access to external financing. Similarly, creditors
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anticipate that mangers with high inside debt compensation will pursue less risky policies 
and require fewer covenants limiting their investing, financing, and payout decisions after 
debt issuance (Anantharaman et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010). Thus, based on 
costly external finance hypothesis (Liu and Mauer, 2011), CEOs with higher inside debt 
may hold less cash as a hedge for future financing needs.
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings, 
as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets where net assets is 
equal to total assets minus cash plus marketable securities, using a sample of 
EXECUCOMP firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Specifically, I test whether CEO 
inside debt is positively or negatively correlated with cash holdings. The main 
explanatory variable o f interest is CEO inside debt holdings. Following previous 
empirical studies on CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use two measures 
as proxies for CEO inside debt holdings: 1) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an 
indicator variable equal to one if  the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is greater than one. 
Utilizing a contemporaneous regression where cash and all independent variables 
including CEO inside debt holdings are measured at time t, I find a positive relation 
between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings. I next examine the relation 
between firm cash holdings and lagged CEO inside debt holdings to mitigate the 
endogeneity problem and the positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and 
firm cash holdings still hold. Further, I use a two-stage regression analysis to explicitly 
control for the endogeneity problem and I find that the main results o f  CEO inside debt 
holdings and firm cash holdings still hold. I next divide the CEO inside debt 
compensation into two main components: pension and deferred compensation and
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examine the effect o f these two components on firm cash holdings to find out the main 
driving channel o f the positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash 
holdings. I find that the deferred compensation is the main driving channel behind the 
positive relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings.
Though CEO inside debt compensation induces CEOs to hold cash, CEOs may 
face constraints in their ability to hold excess cash. Financial constraint status o f the firm 
is one o f the constraining factor and the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and 
firm cash holdings could depend on whether a firm is financially constrained. CEOs o f a 
financially constrained firms may face difficulty accumulating excess cash as their inside 
debt compensation goes up since capital is limited. This implies that the positive relation 
between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt compensation may be mitigated by 
financial constraint status o f the firm. To examine whether financial constraint status o f a 
firm influences the relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash 
holdings, I interact CEO inside debt compensation with several variables that proxy for 
the degree to which a firm is financially constrained. I find significant negative 
coefficients on the interaction terms which imply the mitigating role o f  financial 
constraint status o f the firm on the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO 
inside debt holdings.
Following Cassell et al. (2012), I construct the ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity of 
the value o f the CEO’s accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change 
in the volatility o f stock prices) to delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f the CEO’s equity- 
based compensation to one percent change in the stock price) to control for the effects of 
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences and corporate cash holdings. 1
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include CEO vega/delta ratio in all regressions as a control variable and find a positive 
relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. My empirical finding that firm 
cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt compensation mimics the findings o f Liu 
and Mauer (2011) who investigate the effect o f  CEO equity-based incentives on firm 
cash holdings. In their study, Liu and M auer (2011) document a positive relation between 
equity-based incentives as measured by the sensitivity o f equity compensation to 
volatility (vega) and firm cash holdings. I examine these separate effects by including 
both CEO inside debt compensation and vega in the cash regression and find that the 
positive effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash holdings remains significant 
even after controlling for the effect o f  vega.
Finally, I examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive 
(negative) valuation effect for firms with lower CEO inside debt. Following Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2006), I use a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) 
valuation regression. I find that cash increases have a more positive valuation effect for 
firms with low levels o f CEO inside debt relative to those with high levels o f CEO inside 
debt.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on 
executive compensation focus on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and fixed 
(salary and bonus) compensation, while few studies examine debt-like compensation. 
This paper extends the literature which investigates the incentive effects o f various 
components o f  CEO wealth, particularly CEO equity holdings (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal, 
and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Focusing on a different component
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o f CEO compensation, inside debt, this study provides evidence o f the effect CEO inside 
debt compensation on corporate cash holdings.
Second, this study contributes to a nascent literature on executive compensation 
which investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigates agency costs o f 
debt by strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). To date, extant research (Anantharaman, Fang, 
and Gong, 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011; Wei and 
Yermack, 2011; Francis and Yilmaz, 2012; He, 2011) has focused on market-based 
implications o f CEO inside debt holdings (e.g. reduced cost o f  debt, fewer restrictive debt 
covenants, market reactions after initial disclosures o f CEO inside debt compensation, 
financial reporting quality, etc.). In contrast, this study provides direct evidence o f  the 
effect o f  CEO inside debt on firm investment and financial policies by examining the 
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and corporate cash holdings. Further, I 
extend Cassell et al., (2012), who look at the effect o f  CEO inside debt holdings on firm 
investment and financial policies, by investigating the effect o f CEO inside debt on 
corporate cash holdings.11
Finally, this study adds to the corporate cash holdings literature by documenting 
the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings. Prior literature 
documents several motives for firms to hold cash12: the transaction motive, the 
precautionary motive, the tax motive, and the agency motive. The literature on corporate
11 C assell et al. (2 0 1 2 ) find a p ositive relation b etw een  C EO  inside debt and asset liqu id ity , m easured by  
w orking capital. In m y sam ple for this study, the correlation betw een  w orking capital and firm cash  
hold ings is not significant.
12 See B ates, Kahle, and Stulz, 20 0 9  for details about w hy firm s hold cash.
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cash holdings empirically examines agency theory by viewing cash holdings as a source 
o f financing. My study contributes to the agency motive view of corporate cash holdings 
literature by focusing on the investment perspective o f cash holdings and by exploring 
the link between CEO inside debt and corporate cash-holdings.
C H A P T E R  2
CEO INSIDE DEBT: IS THERE A RELATION 
BETWEEN POST MERGER FIRM RISK 
AND CEO INSIDE DEBT?
Introduction
The separation o f ownership and control in the modern corporation may lead to 
agency conflicts between principals (shareholders and debtholders) and agents 
(managers) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is, managers may not always allocate 
corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. Managers may also 
engage in activities that reallocate wealth from debtholders to shareholders.
Pension and deferred compensation, inside debt, may mitigate agency conflicts 
between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 
2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). In the 
language o f Jensen and Meckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed obligation for 
the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is typically an 
unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded nature of 
inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatment as 
outside creditors. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause CEOs to manage 
their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011).
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Inside debt may also influence managerial incentives to pursue diversifying 
mergers (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). This paper attempts to answer whether higher 
CEO inside debt causes CEO to diversify firm operations and reduce firm risk by 
examining the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation o f post-merger firm risk.
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders occur when managers do 
not allocate corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. For example, 
a primary agency conflict between managers and shareholders involves the 
overinvestment o f free cash flows -  managers may choose to invest in negative net 
present value projects. Prior literature in executive compensation suggests that equity- 
based compensation act as a vehicle to resolve the conflicts o f  interests between 
managers and shareholders. For example, prior studies suggest that stock and stock 
options o f CEO compensation encourage risk-averse CEOs to manage their firms in ways 
that benefit shareholders (Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009).
Agency conflicts between managers (or managers acting for shareholders) and 
debt holders occur when managers increase firm risk in ways that benefit shareholders at 
the expense of debt holders. Debt holders and shareholders have different payoff 
structures -  debt holders are fixed claimants to firm assets while shareholders are residual 
claimants. Once debt is issued, shareholders may increase the value o f their residual 
claims at the expense o f debt holders. For instance, shareholders may increase the risk of 
the firm by changing investment or financial policies (asset substitution or risk shifting) 
in ways that reallocate wealth from debt holders, generally through some increase in the 
overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
Similarly, excessive risk-taking by CEOs through M&As may transfer wealth from debt
59
holders to shareholders by decreasing assets available for meeting fixed claims which 
increases default risk. Equity-based compensation may motivate managers to increase 
overall firm risk through M&As. For instance, Datta, Datta, and Raman (2001) find a 
positive relation between equity-based compensation and the change in stock return 
volatility o f the acquirers.
Thus, while equity-based compensation mitigates agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders, equity-based compensation may exacerbate agency conflicts 
between managers and debt holders by motivating CEOs to take excessive risk at the 
expense o f debtholders. Higher managerial inside debt serves to alleviate agency conflicts 
between managers and debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders. For example, 
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f  CEO inside debt are 
associated with less risky investment and financial policies. With respect to M&As, this 
suggests that CEO inside debt compensation may mitigate excess risk taking by CEOs.
To examine the effect o f CEO inside debt on alleviating agency costs to 
debtholders, I use a sample o f mergers and acquisitions (M&As). M&As are regarded as 
one o f the firm’s major, externally observable investing decisions and this is especially 
true given large capital commitments. In 2007, the aggregate deal value for acquisitions 
o f US targets was $1.37 trillion, while aggregate capital expenditure activity was $1.85 
trillion. This suggests that acquisition activity represents a large proportion o f corporate 
investment (Garfinkel and Hankins, 2011).
There are at least two strong reasons why M&As offer a useful opportunity to test 
the effect o f CEO inside debt on managerial risk-taking behavior. First, M&As represent 
discretionary risk-taking by CEOs and so, M&A activity can dramatically alter the risk
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profile o f the firm by altering the asset structure. Second, M&As may be a possible 
source o f agency conflicts between managers and principals (shareholders and 
debtholders) even though M&As create value through the acquisition o f undervalued 
assets or synergy. For example, agency costs occurring as a result o f  overinvestment by 
acquiring firms are often explained by the free cash hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Lang, 
Stulz, and Walking, 1991) and the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986). Further, due to their 
complexity, M&As are often sources o f information asymmetry problems, a necessary 
condition for agency problems.
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk, 
as measured by the change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk, using 
acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f  2007 to 2009. Following prior literature on 
CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the following two measures as 
proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, which 
is calculated as the CEO’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to equity ratio and 
2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater 
than one. I utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the 
change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative of 
the Merton distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the 
change in pre and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy 
prediction model (Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-merger 
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in 
idiosyncratic risk measured as post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return 
residuals in percentage estimated by the single factor market model.
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I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as measured 
by change in total firm risk, measured as post-merger minus pre-merger stock return 
standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as post­
merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage estimated 
by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured by the CEO 
to firm debt/equity ratio. CEO compensation is not exogenously given but determined by 
the contracting environment and so, concern for endogeneity comes into the picture 
which may make my findings spurious. I adopt the instrumental variable approach to 
address the endogeneity problem. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias 
corrections. I find insignificant negative relations between CEO inside debt holdings 
other two measures o f post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and post-merger distance- 
to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f  the Merton distance-to-default model 
developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008, and the change in pre and post-merger 
default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model (Altman, 1968).
I make several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on executive 
compensation focus primarily on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and fixed 
(salary and bonus) compensation, while studies on debt-like compensation are limited 
due to data availability.13 This paper extends the literature by focusing on a different 
component o f CEO compensation, inside debt. Second, this study provides a contribution 
to a nascent literature on executive compensation which investigates the theoretical 
prediction that inside debt mitigate agency costs o f debt by strengthening the alignment
13 C EO inside debt com pensation  is available on ly  from 2 0 0 6  fiscal year as e ffectiv e  for 2 0 0 6  fiscal year- 
ends, the SEC  issued a requirem ent that firms d isc lo se  their C E O s’ inside debt positions.
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o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). 
Further, I extend Phan (2013), who looks at the relation between CEO inside debt and 
M&As, by investigating the relation between post-merger risk and CEO inside debt 
holdings. I also extend Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2012), who look at the effect o f CEO 
inside debt on firms’ incentives to pursue diversifying acquisitions, by examining 
whether CEO inside debt reduces firm risk after M&As. Finally, this study adds to the 
M&A literature by documenting the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post­
merger firm risk. This is important because prior literature only examines the relation 
between CEO equity-based compensation and M&A (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman, 
2001; Benson, Park and Davidson, 2011).
The remainder o f this essay is organized as follows. I motivate my research, 
review the literature, and develop my hypotheses, provide an overview o f sample 
selection and variables used in this study, methodology, and a description o f my sample, 
discusses empirical results and finish with a conclusion to the second essay.
Literature Review
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and Agency Costs 
Merger and acquisition decisions create opportunities that can intensify the 
inherent conflicts o f interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Numerous studies find that corporate merger and acquisition decisions are often 
related to agency conflicts. These studies recognize possible links between mergers and 
managerial self-interest. It is well recognized that managers do not always make 
shareholder value-maximizing acquisitions.
63
Jensen (1986) suggests that the free cash flow hypothesis can be used to 
understand overinvestment by acquiring firms. Jensen (1986) document that conflicts of 
interest between agents and owners are especially severe when the firm generates 
substantial free cash flow, the cash flow in excess o f that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost o f  capital. The free 
cash flow hypothesis argues that managers realize large personal gains from empire 
building. Firms with abundant free cash flows but few profitable investment opportunities 
are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions than to return the excess cash flows 
to shareholders. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) provide empirical evidence supporting 
the free cash flow hypothesis using a sample o f firms that decide to acquire control o f 
other firms through tender offers. Roll (1986) presents a hubris hypothesis to explain 
overinvestment by acquiring firms. According to the hubris hypothesis, managers 
overestimate the value o f what they buy and so, most o f the times, they simply overpay. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) document that several corporate acquisitions seem to 
be governed by the desire o f managers to switch into businesses with long term growth 
potential even when the managers have no special expertise in running such businesses 
when the value maximizing strategy should be to distribute free cash flows to 
shareholders. Morck et al. (1990) recognize several types of acquisitions including 
diversifying acquisitions and acquisitions o f high growth targets that can yield substantial 
benefits to managers, while at the same time hurting shareholders. Recently, Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2007) focus on corporate acquisition decisions and find that bidders with 
more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower abnormal returns around 
acquisition announcements. The empirical results support the hypothesis that managers
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protected by more antitakeover provisions face weaker discipline from the market for 
corporate control and so, tend to indulge in empire building acquisitions that destroy 
shareholder returns.
Conversely, studies suggest that M&As may increase bondholder wealth through 
the co-insurance effect as the probability o f default decreases when the assets and 
liabilities o f  two firms are combined through M&As as compared to the likelihood of 
default in individual firms (Levy and Samat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Higgins and Schall, 
1975). The co-insurance effect suggests that diversifying M&As are beneficial to 
bondholders because existing risky debt is spread across the new firm ’s operations which 
have imperfectly correlated cash flows. Billet, King, and Mauer (2004) investigate the 
wealth effects o f M&As on target and acquirer bondholders during 1980s and 1990s and 
find that below investment grade bonds o f target firms earn significantly positive 
announcement period returns in support o f co-insurance effect. On the other hand, Shastri 
(1990) note that merged firm bondholders may either gain from co-insurance effect or 
lose from expropriation effect when merging firms may have different leverage ratios, 
risk levels, and debt maturities. Datta, Datta, and Raman (2001) note that if  CEO 
compensation is biased toward equity, acquirers tend to select riskier targets with higher 
growth opportunities and acquirers become riskier following the M&A deals. This 
suggests that during M&As CEO may engage in activities to increase firm risk beyond 
that which debtholders prefer and this, in turn, leads to agency conflicts between 
debtholders and managers or managers acting for shareholders.
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Inside Debt Compensation as a Means to Reduce 
Agency Costs o f  Debt
Many CEOs in the US hold significant amounts o f  pay in the form of defined 
benefit pension plans and deferred compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei 
and Yermack, 2011). These forms o f executive compensation are defined as inside debt 
(in the language o f Jensen and Meckling (1976)) as this compensation represents a fixed 
obligation for the firm to make future payments to corporate insiders. Inside debt 
compensation are unsecured and unfunded, exposing CEOs to the same default risks and 
insolvency treatment as outside creditors. Therefore, CEO inside debt compensation can 
be used as a vehicle to mitigate the agency costs o f  debt (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2011; Cassell et al., 
2012).
Agency costs o f  debt occur when managers vary the firm’s investment policy, 
payout policy, or capital structure in ways that reallocate wealth from debtholders to 
stockholders, generally through some increase in the overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). To alleviate the agency costs o f  debt, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) recommend implementing an optimal incentive structure 
under which the CEO’s personal holdings o f the firm’s debt and equity ratio is similar to 
the firm’s overall capital structure. Based on agency theory, studies on CEO inside debt 
compensation find that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings prefer less risky 
investment and financial policies (Cassell et al., 2012). Sundaram and Yermack (2007) 
find that as the value o f a CEO’s pension increases relative to the value o f her equity 
holdings, risk taking, as measured by distance-to-default declines. Wei and Yermack
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(2 0 1 1 ) examine stockholder and bondholder reactions to firms’ initial reports o f  their 
CEOs’ inside debt positions in early 2007 when new SEC disclosure rules took effect. 
The authors find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility o f both 
securities drops upon disclosures by firms where the CEO has a sizeable defined benefit 
pension or deferred compensation. This suggests that inside debt may reduce firm risk 
and transfer wealth from equity toward debt. This is also consistent with the idea that 
investors anticipate less risk taking by managers with higher levels o f inside debt.
Several recent studies also find a negative relation between CEO inside debt 
holdings and the cost o f debt (Anantharaman et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; 
Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011). When compensation packages o f  CEOs consist o f  both inside 
debt compensation and equity-based compensation, CEO incentives vary with the relative 
importance o f debt versus equity based compensation in the pay structure (inside leverage 
o f the CEO). The higher a CEO’s inside leverage relative to firm leverage (the CEOs’ 
relative leverage), the more closely the CEO’s incentives are aligned with debtholders 
vis-a-vis shareholders and the lesser the degree to which CEO engages in risk-seeking 
behavior to damage debt holders wealth (Edmans and Liu, 2011). Anantharaman et al., 
2010 argues that if  debtholders realize the incentive effects o f CEO inside debt holdings, 
firms providing CEOs with higher relative leverage should bear a lower borrowing cost 
and fewer covenants. Utilizing a sample o f private loans originated during 2006-2008, 
they find that higher CEO relative leverage is associated with lower cost o f  debt 
financing and fewer restrictive covenants. Wang et al., 2011 posit that banks demand 
lower yield spreads and less strict terms on loans to firms where CEOs have large inside 
debt holdings. Using a sample o f 1,280 loan facilities for 676 unique firms originated for
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the period o f 2007 to 2010, they find that banks charge lower yield spreads on loans 
when CEOs o f those firms hold larger inside debt holdings. Empirical evidence also 
shows that loans to firms providing CEOs with larger inside debt holdings are associated 
with fewer covenant restrictions. This is consistent with the view that debtholders 
anticipate lower expropriation risk by firms with larger CEO inside debt holdings. For 
instance, Chen, Dou, and Wang (2010) find that public debtholders charge lower interest 
rates to the firms providing CEOs with more inside debt. In addition, they find that the 
level o f CEO inside debt holdings exhibits a negative relation with restrictive debt 
covenants.
Hypothesis Development
As such, CEO inside debt compensation may perform an essential alignment role 
between CEOs and debtholders by reducing CEOs’ excessive risk-taking incentives. 
Higher managerial inside debt serves to alleviate agency conflicts between managers and 
debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders. For example, Cassell, Huang, 
Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f  CEO inside debt are associated with 
less risky investment and financial policies. CEOs can also reduce the riskiness o f  their 
firms’ operations by diversifying firms’ operations among different industry segments 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Further, Cassell et al. (2012) 
expect that CEO with large inside debt holdings diversify firm operations since 
diversified firm faces a reduced exposure to bankruptcy. Based on prior literature, I 
conjecture that, all else being equal, CEO inside debt is associated with a risk 
management strategy in M&As. Large CEO inside debt holdings may motivate CEOs to 
engage in diversifying M&A in order to reduce firm risk. Consistent with the evidence
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that CEO inside debt compensation motivates CEOs to engage in less risky investment 
and financial decisions, I expect that there exists a negative relation between post-merger 
firm risk and CEO inside debt compensation.
H i: The post-merger risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
The implies that CEOs with higher inside debt compensation are more aligned 
with debtholders and so, they are more likely to conduct less risky M&As that are more 
likely to benefit debtholders.
Sample Selection and Data
Sample Selection
I obtain the initial sample o f  corporate acquisitions from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC). I focus only on acquisitions o f  United States (U.S.) targets to reduce 
the potential effect o f risks o f  targets’ domicile countries on my empirical tests. My 
initial sample includes M&As announced between 2007 and 2009. 2007 marks the 
beginning o f the sample period because 2006 is the first year that EXECUCOMP reports 
CEO pension and deferred compensation information. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) required all firms to expand executive compensation disclosure 
effective in 2006 fiscal year end. Following conventions in the M&A literature, I require 
that the sample satisfy the following criteria: ( 1 ) the deal should be completed, (2 ) the 
transaction value needs to be at least one million dollars, (3) The acquirer controls less 
than 50% of the shares o f  the target at the time o f the announcement and obtains 100% of 
the target shares, and (4) necessary information on each transaction should be available. 
Necessary information includes transaction date, types (merger vs. tender offer). I match 
this initial data with COMPUSTAT for accounting data and Center for Research in
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Securities Prices (CRSP) for stock price data. I then merge the sample with compensation 
information from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP database. EXECUCOMP includes 
annual compensation data from proxy statements for the five highest paid executives for 
firms in the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600.
Following prior literature, I exclude all financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) as 
liquidity is hard to access in these firms. I also exclude all utility firms (SIC codes 4900- 
4999) due to their unique regulatory environment. My final sample does not include all­
equity acquirers (zero debt) or acquires having missing debt as CEO to firm debt/equity 
ratio cannot be computed for these firms. This may raise a question if  CEO inside debt 
compensation does not matter for all-equity firms. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue 
that the incentive impact o f debt and equity holdings o f CEOs depends on the capital 
structure o f the firm. When a firm has debt and equity in its capital structure, then the 
CEO tends to shift risk from shareholders to debtholders if  the CEO has only equity 
holdings in the firm. Compensating CEOs with pension and deferred compensation aligns 
interests o f CEOs with that o f debtholders which in turn, reduces agency costs o f  debt. 
CEO inside debt compensation impacts on decision-making by CEOs only when firm has 
debt in the capital structure. Therefore, CEO inside debt compensation does not matter 
for all-equity firms as risk shifting from shareholders to debtholders by CEOs does not 
happen for these firms.
Some acquirers in my sample made more than one M&A announcement in a year. 
To rule out the possibility that empirical results can be driven by serial M&As pursed by 
these acquirers, I keep only the earliest merger pursued by each acquirer in a given year.
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After deleting firms with missing values for explanatory variables, I have a final matched 
sample o f 330 deals from 2007 to 2009.
Variable Descriptions 
The primary dependent variable is post-merger equity risk. The primary 
independent variable is CEO inside debt holdings. I also include several additional 
control variables that are related to both M&A and CEO inside debt holdings. Appendix 
B provides a precise description of all the variables utilized in my analysis.
Post-Merger Equity Risk
I am planning to use the difference in distance-to default before and after the 
merger as the main dependent variable. The change in the distance-to-default o f  a firm is 
utilized as an indicator to show if the M&A increase the value o f  the firm and as a 
consequence the distance-to-default became larger. The distance-to-default will be 
calculated before and after the merger year where the merger year is the year when the 
merger became effective. The difference between the resulting numbers will be the 
dependent variable. I will utilize a naive alternative o f the Merton distance-to-default 
model (developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008) to calculate the distance-to-default 
before and after the merger. The method is as described below:
First, the market value o f equity, the face value o f  debt, the volatility o f  stock 
returns and the risk-free rate are obtained. The market value o f a firm ’s equity is 
measured as the product o f the acquirer’s share price and the number o f  shares. The face 
value o f debt is calculated as the sum o f current liabilities and one half o f  the com pany’s 
long-term debt, following Bharath & Shumway (2008) and Vassalou & Xing (2004). The 
volatility o f stock returns is estimated by calculating the annualized percent standard
71
deviation o f returns using prior monthly stock return data from the CRSP database. Last, 
the acquirer’s stock return over the year previous to the M&A is generated. The derived 
inputs are then used to calculate the missing variables which are the volatility o f  the 
firm’s debt, the total firm volatility and finally the naive distance-to-default. The 
following formulas based on Bharath and Shumway (2008) are used to calculate the 
distance-to-default:
Volatility o f each firm’s debt 
Naive oD = 0.05 + 0.25 *oE 
Total volatility o f  the firm
Naive aV  = (E /  E  + naive D) *aE + (naive D /  E + naive D) * naive oD 
= ( E / E  + F)*oE  + ( F / E  + F)*(0.05 + 0.25*aE)
Naive distance-to-default
Naive DD  = [In((E + F)/F) + (r„./ -  0.5 naive ov2)T ]  / naive ovv!t  (Equation 12 o f  
Bharath and Shumway (2008) paper)
Altman Bankruptcy Prediction Model (Altman, 1968) is used as an alternative 
model to measure a firm ’s default risk. Altman bankruptcy prediction model classifies a 
firm as bankrupt if  it yields a z-score below 1.8 (Altman, 1968) and a firm is likely to be
financially sound if the Z-score o f the firm is greater than 2.99. Following prior M&A
study, the Altman Z-Score is calculated using the equation given below:
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5 
where XI = working capital / total assets 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets 
X3 = earnings before interest and tax / total assets
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X4 = market value o f equity / book value o f total debt 
X5 = sales / total assets
Further following prior literature on CEO compensation and M&A, my study will 
utilize another two measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: change in total firm risk 
measured as post-merger minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage 
and change in idiosyncratic risk measured as post-merger minus pre-merger standard 
deviation o f return residuals in percentage estimated by the single factor market model. I 
use daily stock returns for the standard deviation calculation but non-tabulated results 
using monthly return volatilities are similar to my main findings.
CEO Inside Debt Holdings
The primary explanatory variable is CEO inside debt holdings measured at the 
end of the fiscal year (t-1) relative to the M&A announcement. Following prior literature 
on CEO inside debt holdings (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012), I use two measures for CEO 
inside debt holdings: 1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable 
equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than one. The first 
measure, the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, is calculated as the CEO’s debt/equity ratio 
scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio. The CEO ’s debt/ equity ratio is calculated as 
CEO inside debt holdings scaled by CEO equity holdings. CEO inside debt holdings are 
calculated as the sum of the present value o f accumulated pension benefits and deferred 
compensation. CEO equity holdings are calculated as the value o f both stock and stock 
options held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated by multiplying the 
number o f shares held by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year end and the value of 
option is calculated by multiplying the total option delta (using the Black-Scholes (1973))
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by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year end. Firm debt is the sum o f current and long­
term debt. Firm equity is the product o f shares outstanding and the stock price at the 
firm’s fiscal year end. My second measure is an indicator variable equal to one when the 
CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than one (i.e. the CEO is more levered than the 
firm), and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
CEO compensation incentives. I include additional control variables to proxy for 
CEO compensation incentives that influence post-merger firm risk. Following prior 
literature (for example, Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
2006), I measure CEO compensation incentives by the sensitivity o f  CEO wealth to stock 
return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity o f CEO wealth to stock price (delta). 
Following prior literature on CEO inside debt (for example, Cassell et al., 2012), I 
construct the ratio o f the vega to delta (CEO vega/delta ratio) to control for the effects of 
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences. I adjust the CEO vega/delta ratio 
by multiplying it by the ratio o f total CEO equity holdings to CEO inside debt to capture 
the relative importance o f the CEO’s accumulated equity holdings . 1 4
Firm-specific control variables. I include several control variables based on the 
previous M&A literature and CEO inside debt literature. Following Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007), I control for firm size (the log o f total assets) and leverage (long-term 
debt/total assets) because default risk is generally large for small firms and highly 
leveraged firms. Jensen (1993) argues that monitoring o f  high-growth firms is costly 
while Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that firms with higher stock return volatility have
14 If C EO equity hold ings are large (sm all), the effect o f  the C EO  vega/d elta  ratio is likely  to be large 
(sm all).
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higher levels o f  information asymmetry. Following prior literature (Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002), I include Tobin’s Q, the level o f  R&D expenditures 
(R&D/total assets), the level o f advertising expenditures (adverting expense/ total assets), 
capital expenditures (capital expenditures/sales), and prior total firm risk to proxy for 
growth opportunities and information asymmetry. The relation between CEO inside debt 
compensation and post-merger firm risk may also depend on the characteristics o f the 
merger transaction. Following Benson, Park and Davidson (2011), I include a dummy 
variable equal to one if the acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) 
and the ratio o f transaction value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio).
Methodology
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk in 
this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions o f  post-merger firm risk on 
CEO inside debt compensation. To examine the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on 
post-merger firm risk I employ the following model:
DID| tfi = a + Pi (CEO inside debt compensation) , /  + ftk (controls) , + /?, £ ( 2  -  
d ig it  SIC d u m m y  va ria b les), + fiy Y S y ea r d u m m y  va ria b les), + eit
As CEO compensation is not exogenously given but determined by the 
contracting environment, there is a concern for endogeneity. The estimated coefficients in 
my regressions may be biased as CEO compensation is endogenously formed. The main 
problem o f my analysis is that there can be omitted firm characteristics and CEO 
characteristics that affect both CEO compensation and the firm’s M&A decisions. 
Therefore, after presenting multivariate regressions of post-merger firm risk on CEO
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inside debt compensation, I adopt an instrument variable (IV) approach to address the 
endogeneity problem.
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at upper and lower 1 % o f the sample distribution to address potential 
problems associated with extreme observations. Panel A of Table 2.1 provides the 
distribution o f the sample firms across years. The number o f  M&A deals decreases from 
135 in 2007 to 85 in 2009, which coincides with the recent financial crisis in US.
Panel B o f Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics o f  acquirer firm. I find that the 
mean (median) acquirer CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is 2.034 (0.273). The mean 
(median) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l is 0.353 (0.000) indicating that CEO’s debt-to- 
equity ratio is less than firm’s debt-to-equity ratio for the majority o f  my sample firms.
Table 2.1
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year
year Frequency Percent
2007 135 40.91
2008 1 1 0 33.33
2009 85 25.76
Total 330 1 0 0
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Panel B: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev P25 Median P75
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 330 2.034 5.891 0.000 0.273 1.459
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio > 1 330 0.353 0.417 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm Size 330 8.131 1.685 7.092 8.269 9.594
Leverage 330 0.231 0.147 0.178 0.203 0.305
Tobin's Q 330 2.379 3.896 0.893 1.397 2.584
R&D/Total Assets 330 0.042 0.063 0.000 0.016 0.069
Adv./Total Assets 330 0 . 0 1 1 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.005
CAPEX/Sales 330 0.079 0.141 0.024 0.046 0.076
Deal Ratio 330 0.143 0.162 0.019 0.081 0.184
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 330 0.294 0.317 0.072 0.196 0.461
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics o f my sample. Variables include the 
natural log o f one plus the ratio o f CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio (CEO to firm debt/equity 
ratio), a dummy variable that equals one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than 
one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l), the ratio o f CEO vega to the 
delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum of 
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the 
ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f  research and 
development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio o f  advertising expense to total 
assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book value of 
debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q) and the ratio o f transaction value to acquirer’s market 
value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in 
Appendix B. Data are obtained from SDC, COMPUSTAT, CRSP and EXECUCOMP 
and consist o f 330 deals from 2007 to 2009. Panel A reports sample distribution by year. 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics o f independent variables utilized in this study.
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Empirical Results
I examine the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk in 
this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions o f post-merger firm risk on 
CEO inside debt compensation.
Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk,
Measured by Bharath and Shumway (2008)
Distance-to-Default Model
I begin by examining the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger 
firm risk. It is noteworthy to mention that distant-to-default increases for 99 firms out of 
330 firms while distance-to-default deceases for other 231 firms after the M&A. 
Following prior studies on M&A and CEO compensation, I examine the effect o f  lagged 
CEO inside debt compensation o f post-merger firm risk to control for potential 
endogeneity o f compensation incentives. Table 2.2 reports the results o f  multivariate 
regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and Two report 
results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first measure of 
CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and Four include 
the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l.
Table 2.2
The Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk, M easured by 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) Distance-to-Default Model
(1)__________ (2)_________(3)__________(4)
-0.0193 -0.0074
(-0 .2 2 ) (-0.61)
-0.0102 -0.0045
(-0.80) (-0.97)
-0.461 -0.445
(-0.59) (-0.52)
15.37 *** 15.59 ***
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l 
Firm Size 
Leverage
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Table 2.2 (Continued)
(2.93) (2.78)
Tobin’s Q 27.13 *** 27.37 ***
(14.21) (13.44)
R&D/Total Assets 0.0451 *** 0.0476 ***
(3.62) (3.85)
Adv./Total Assets -0.0001 -0.0002
(-0.27) (-0.19)
CAPEX/Sales 0.013 *** 0.015 ***
(2.71) (2.95)
Stock Dummy -0.769 ** -0.834 **
(-2.08) (-2.19)
Deal Ratio 0.007 0.006
(0.33) (0.47)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.0004 0.0002
(0.63)___________________ (0.51)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 330 330 330 330
Adj. R 2 0.27 0.34 0.24 0.31
Table 2.2 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger 
firm risk, measured as the difference in distance-to default before and after the merger 
utilizing a naive alternative o f the Merton distance-to-default model (developed by 
Bharath and Shumway, 2008). All models control for industry and year fixed effect, 
where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The 
dependent variable is the change in distance-to-default before and after the merger. The 
two main independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: 
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value o f one i f  CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). 
Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the 
natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum o f  long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the ratio o f  capital expenditures to sales
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(CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research and development expense to total assets 
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f advertising expense to total assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio 
o f  market value o f the equity plus the book value o f  debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a 
dummy variable that equal to one if the acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock 
Dummy) and the ratio o f  transaction value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal 
Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 
2006 - 2010. Models One and Two report results where the main explanatory variable is 
the first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while 
Models Three and Four report results where the main explanatory variable is the second 
measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The r-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f  significance of 
10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative but 
interestingly they are not significant in Models One and Two. The results do not support 
Hi, which predicts that post-merger firm risk, measured as distance-to-default, is 
decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. My conclusions are unchanged using an 
alternative proxy for inside debt in Models Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on 
CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are negative but not significant. Overall, no significant 
relation is detected between CEO inside debt holdings and the firm ’s engagement in 
M&A to decrease firm risk.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk,
Measured by Altman (1968) Bankruptcy Prediction Model
Next, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm 
risk, measured by using the Altman bankruptcy prediction model (Altman, 1968). Table
2.3 reports the results o f multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed 
effect. Models One and Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory 
variable is the first measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. 
Models Three and Four include the alternative measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings, 
CEO to firm debt/equity ra tio> l.
Table 2.3
The Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk, M easured by Altman 
(1968) Bankruptcy Prediction Model
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.4043 -0.3791
(-0.78) (-0.37)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l -0.4703 -0.4437
(-0.63) (-0.42)
Firm Size -12.35 -12.51
(-0.23) (-0.47)
Leverage 715.74 721.85
(0.65) (0.97)
Tobin's Q 523.24 533.13
(1.41) (1.35)
R&D/Total Assets 0.007 * 0.009 *
(2.19) (1.98)
Adv./Total Assets -0.0003 -0.0003
(-1.09) (-1.23)
CAPEX/Sales 0.009 ** 0.008 **
(2.24) (2.37)
Stock Dummy -0.713 * -0.739 *
(-1.73) (-1.87)
Deal Ratio 0.0005 0.0006
(0.28) (0.53)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.84) (0.72)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 330 330 330 330
Adj. R2 0.19 0 . 2 2 0 . 2 0 0.23
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Table 2.3 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger 
firm risk, measured as the difference default risk before and after the merger utilizing 
Altman (1968) Bankruptcy Prediction Model. All models control for industry and year 
fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry 
classification. The dependent variable is the change in Altman Z-score before and after 
the merger. The two main independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO inside 
debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value o f one if 
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO 
Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum o f long-term 
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the ratio of 
capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f  research and development 
expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio o f  advertising expense to total assets 
(Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f  market value o f the equity plus the book value o f  debt to 
the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one if  the acquisition is 
financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction value to 
acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f  all variables are 
reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. Models One and Two report 
results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f CEO inside debt 
holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings 
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels of significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative but 
interestingly they are not significant in Models One and Two. The results do not support 
Hi, which predicts that post-merger firm risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. 
My conclusions are unchanged using an alternative proxy for inside debt in Models Three 
and Four. The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are negative but not 
significant. Overall, no significant relation is detected between CEO inside debt holdings 
and post-merger firm risk. My results do not support the argument that CEOs with higher 
inside debt holdings are more aligned with debtholders by conducting less risky M&As 
that are more likely to benefit debtholders.
Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger 
Firm Risk, Measured by Total Firm-Risk
Next, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm 
risk, measured by change in total firm risk. A change in total risk is measured as post­
merger minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily 
stock returns for the standard deviation calculation . 15 Table 2.4 reports the results of 
multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and 
Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first 
measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and 
Four include the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm 
debt/equity ratio> 1 .
15 N on-tabulated results using m onthly return vo latilities are sim ilar to m y main findings.
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Table 2.4
The Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk, M easured by Total 
Firm Risk
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0063 * -0.0057 *
(-1.85) (-1.76)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l -0.009 -0.0084
(-1.17) (-1.03)
Firm Size -0.093 -0.024
(-0.63) (-0.37)
Leverage 0.773 0.835
(0.93) (0.64)
Tobin's Q 0.131 0.157
(1.56) (1.33)
R&D/Total Assets 0.0078 ** 0.0083 **
(2.32) (2.27)
Adv./Total Assets -0.0071 -0.0083
(-0.87) (-1.06)
CAPEX/Sales 0.0084 ** 0.0092 **
(2.38) (2.17)
Stock Dummy -0.835 ** -0.863 **
(-2.43) (-2.24)
Deal Ratio 0.113 0 . 1 2 1
(0.19) (0 .2 0 )
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.00008 0.00009
(1.03) (1.07)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 330 330 330 330
Adj. R2 0 . 2 1 0.23 0 . 2 2 0.24
Table 2.4 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger 
firm risk, measured as the change in total firm risk. All models control for industry and 
year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry 
classification. The dependent variable is the change in total risk measured as post-merger 
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily stock 
returns for the standard deviation calculation. The two main independent variables are
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two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a 
dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one 
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio of 
CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm 
Size), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets 
(Leverage), the ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research 
and development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio of advertising expense to 
total assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f  market value o f the equity plus the book 
value o f debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one i f  the 
acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction 
value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f  all 
variables are reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. Models One and 
Two report results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f  CEO inside 
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings 
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative and 
significant in Models One and Two. The results support H i, which predicts that post­
merger firm risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. In Models Three and Four, 
the estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are negative but not significant.
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Overall, multivariate results indicate some evidence that CEO inside debt holdings have a
negative impact on the change in acquirer firm risk.
Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk,
Measured by Idiosyncratic Risk
Next, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm
risk, measured by change in idiosyncratic risk. A change in idiosyncratic risk is measured
as post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f  return residuals in percentage
estimated by the single factor market model. Table 2.5 reports the results o f multivariate
regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and Two report
results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f
CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and Four include
the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ra tio > l.
Table 2.5
The Effect o f  CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-Merger Firm Risk, M easured by 
Idiosyncratic Risk
__________________________________________(!)__________(2) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.007 * -0.006 *
(-1.81) (-1.89)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l -0.078 -0.081
(-0 . 1 1 ) (-0.35)
Firm Size -0.023 -0.029
(-0.45) (-0.53)
Leverage -0.347 -0.307
(0.87) (0.73)
Tobin's Q -0.037 -0.034
(-1.41) (-1.29)
R&D/Total Assets -0.187 * -0.158
(-1.74) (-1.83)
Adv./Total Assets 0.474 * 0.459
(1.69) (1.78)
CAPEX/Sales -0.068 -0.074
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
(-0.76) (-0.71)
Stock Dummy -0.517 * -0.501 *
(-1.74) (-1.86)
Deal Ratio 0.061 0.064
Table 2.5 (Continued)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
(0.16)
-0 . 0 0 0 2
(-1.17)
(0.13)
-0.0003
(-1.32)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 330 330 330 330
Adj. R2 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.17
Table 2.5 reports results o f the effect o f  CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger 
firm risk, measured by the change in idiosyncratic risk. All models control for industry 
and year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry 
classification. The dependent variable is the change in idiosyncratic risk measured as 
post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage 
estimated by the single factor market model. The two main independent variables are two 
measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a 
dummy variable with a value o f one if  CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one 
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f 
CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm 
Size), the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets 
(Leverage), the ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f  research 
and development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio of advertising expense to 
total assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f  market value o f the equity plus the book 
value o f debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one if  the
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acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction 
value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f  all 
variables are reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. Models One and 
Two report results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f  CEO inside 
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings 
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative and 
significant in Models One and Two. The results support Hi, which predicts that post­
merger firm risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. In Models Three and Four, 
the estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity>l are negative but not significant. 
Overall, multivariate results indicate some weak evidence that CEO inside debt holdings 
have a negative impact on the change in acquirer firm risk, measured by the change in 
idiosyncratic risk.
Exploring Endogeneity
My multivariate analysis is based on OLS regression. My analysis assumes that 
CEO inside debt compensation is exogenous whereas CEO inside debt compensation 
could be determined endogenously with the M&A decision. The possibility that CEO 
inside debt compensation is endogenous gives rise to two related concerns. First, the 
direction o f causality between CEO inside debt compensation and firm ’s M&A decision 
is hard to conclude. It is possible that M&A decision change firm value which requires
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the adjustment in CEO inside debt compensation. This imply that the contemporaneous 
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm’s M&A decision is subject to 
the concern that M&A decisions lead to changes in CEO inside debt compensation. By 
estimating the impact o f CEO inside debt holdings on future firm’s M&A decision, I 
attempt to control for the potential endogeneity that exists between CEO compensation 
structure and firm cash policy.
Second, the model specification suffers an omitted variable bias and 
consequently, the model does not capture all determinants o f  firm’s M&A decision and 
there are unobserved firm-specific and CEO-specific characteristics that influence both 
firm’s M&A decision and CEO inside debt compensation. I adopt an instrument variable 
approach to explicitly account for endogeneity issue. I discuss this approach and 
empirical results in the following section.
Instrumental Variable Approach
Prior literature on CEO compensation employs an instrumental variable approach 
(IV) is to address endogeneity problem. Following prior literature on CEO inside debt 
compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Anantharaman et al., 2011 and Cassell et 
al., 2012), I include the following variables as instruments for CEO inside debt holdings: 
CEO age16; Firm age; a dummy variable (Liquidity Constraint) that equals to one if the 
firm is facing liquidity constraint indicated by negative operating cash flow, and zero 
otherwise; a dummy variable (Tax Status) that equals to one if the firm has favorable tax 
status identified by if the firm has a loss carry-forward, and zero otherwise; maximum
16 F o llow in g  C assell et al., 2012 , 1 do not include C E O  tenure as another instrument sin ce  C E O  age and 
C E O  tenure tend to be h ighly correlated.
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state tax rate on individual income. The tax rates are obtained from 
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/ and these rates are calculated using the 
TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). I estimate my models using a two-stage 
least-squares framework to explicitly account for endogeneity issue. In the first stage, I 
separately regress CEO inside debt holdings on all o f the independent variables along 
with the instruments. The second stage then utilizes the predicted value o f CEO inside 
debt holdings from the first stage.
Table 2.6 reports the second-stage regression in which CEO inside debt holding is 
replaced by its predicted value from its respective first-stage regression. The dependent 
variable is change in total firm risk. A change in total risk is measured as post-merger 
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily stock 
returns for the standard deviation calculation. Models One and Two report results for the 
full sample where the main explanatory variable is the predicted values o f  first measure 
of CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and Four 
include the predicted values o f alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio>l. The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are 
negative and significant in Models One and Two. This supports H i, which predicts that 
post-merger risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. The estimated coefficient of 
the alternative proxy for CEO inside debt in Models Three and Four is negative but not 
significant. The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity> 1 are positive and 
significant. Overall, results from two-stage least-squares framework provide some 
evidence that the firm post-merger risk, measured by the change in total firm risk, is 
decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
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Table 2.6
2SLS Regressions o f  Post-Merger Firm Risk on CEO Inside Debt Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio -0.0074 * -0.0069 *
(-1.67) (-1.73)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l -0.0095 -0.0089
(-0.49) (-0.31)
Firm Size -0.076 -0.068
(-0.73) (-0.46)
Leverage 0.645 0.664
(0.87) (0.94)
Tobin's Q 0.234 0.229
(1.55) (1.48)
R&D/Total Assets 0.0089 ** 0.0096 **
(2.49) (2.33)
Adv./Total Assets -0.0063 -0.0069
(-0.58) (-0.72)
CAPEX/Sales 0.0093 * 0.0095 *
(1.81) (1.93)
Stock Dummy -1.015 ** -1.003 **
(-2.19) (-2.08)
Deal Ratio 0.091 0.097
(0.38) (0.23)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.0002 0.0001
(0.71) (0.79)
Industry and year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
N 297 297 297 297
Adj. R2 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26
Table 2.6 reports results o f  the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger 
firm risk, measured as the change in total firm risk, in two stage least square where in the 
first stage CEO inside debt holdings are regressed on all independent variables plus 
instruments and in the second stage post-merger firm risk is regressed on the predicted 
values o f CEO inside debt compensation. All models control for industry and year fixed 
effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification.
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The dependent variable is the change in total risk measured as post-merger minus pre­
merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily stock returns for the 
standard deviation calculation. The two main independent variables are two measures to 
proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable 
with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise 
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f  CEO vega to the 
delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm of net assets (Firm Size), the sum of 
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the 
ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f  research and 
development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio o f  advertising expense to total 
assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f  market value o f the equity plus the book value of 
debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one if  the acquisition 
is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction value to 
acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f  all variables are 
reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. Models One and Two report 
results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f  CEO inside debt 
holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results 
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f  CEO inside debt holdings 
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
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Conclusion
Pension and deferred compensation, inside debt, may mitigate agency conflicts 
between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 
2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). In the 
language o f Jensen and Meckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed obligation for 
the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is typically an 
unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded nature of 
inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatment as 
outside creditors. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause CEOs to manage 
their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Inside 
debt may also influence managerial incentives to pursue diversifying mergers (Sundaram 
and Yermack, 2007). This paper attempts to answer whether higher CEO inside debt 
causes CEO to diversify firm operations and reduce firm risk by examining the effect of 
CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger firm risk.
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk, 
as measured by the change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk, using 
acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f  2007 to 2009. Following prior literature on 
CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the following two measures as 
proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, which 
is calculated as the CEO’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to equity ratio and 
2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater 
than one. I utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the 
change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative of
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the Merton distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the 
change in pre and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy 
prediction model (Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-merger 
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in 
idiosyncratic risk measured as post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return 
residuals in percentage estimated by the single factor market model.
I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as measured 
by change in total firm risk, measured as post-merger minus pre-merger stock return 
standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as post­
merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage estimated 
by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured by the CEO 
to firm debt/equity ratio. CEO compensation is not exogenously given but determined by 
the contracting environment and so, concern for endogeneity comes into the picture 
which may make my findings spurious. I adopt an instrumental variable approach to 
address the endogeneity problem. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias 
corrections. I find insignificant negative relations between CEO inside debt holdings 
other two measures o f post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and post-merger distance- 
to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the Merton distance-to-default model 
developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008, and the change in pre and post-merger 
default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model (Altman, 1968).
As documented in Sundaram and Yermack (2007), by affecting both the overall 
level o f CEO compensation and its composition, CEO inside debt holdings may influence 
managerial incentives to pursue diversifying mergers. Thus my research question of
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whether and how CEO inside debt is related to post merger firm risk remains an 
important question. I make several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on 
executive compensation focus primarily on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and 
fixed (salary and bonus) compensation, while studies on debt-like compensation are 
limited due to data availability. CEO inside debt compensation is available only from 
2006 fiscal year as effective 2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that 
firms disclose their CEOs’ inside debt positions. This paper extends the literature by 
focusing on a different component o f  CEO compensation, inside debt. Second, this study 
provides a contribution to a nascent literature on executive compensation which 
investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigate agency costs o f debt by 
strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Finally, this study adds to the M&A literature by 
documenting the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk. This 
is important because prior literature only examines the relation between CEO equity- 
based compensation and M&A (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman, 2001; Benson, Park and 
Davidson, 2011).
C H A P T E R  3
CONCLUSION
CEO inside debt compensation, mainly comprised of pension and deferred 
compensation, may mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and debt holders by 
aligning the interests o f mangers with those o f debt holders ((Sundaram and Yermack, 
2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and 
Stuart, 2012). In the language o f Jensen and Meckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a 
fixed obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt 
is typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded 
nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatment 
as outside debt holders. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause managers 
to manage their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 
2011). Studies on CEO inside debt compensation are limited due to data availability. 
CEO inside debt compensation is available only from 2006 fiscal year as effective for 
2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that firms disclose their CEO s’ 
inside debt positions. This dissertation comprises o f  two essays that look at the relation 
between CEO inside debt holdings and two different corporate policies: corporate cash 
holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
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Following prior literature on CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the 
following two measures as proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to 
firm debt/equity ratio, which is calculated as the CEO ’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the 
firm ’s debt to equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm 
debt/ equity ratio is greater than one.
In the first essay, I examine the effect CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash 
holdings, as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets using a 
sample o f EXECUCOMP firms over the period of 2006 to 2008. Higher CEO inside debt 
compensation alleviates agency conflicts between managers and debt holders by aligning 
mangers with debt holders. CEOs with higher inside debt may prefer to invest in cash as 
cash holdings are less risky projects (Tong, 2010). Consequently, based on risk-aversion 
hypothesis, I posit a positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate 
cash holdings. I find a significant and positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings 
and firm cash holdings. I find that the positive relation between CEO inside debt 
compensation and firm cash holdings remain significant even after controlling for the 
effect o f CEO equity-based incentives on firm cash holdings. I also find that the positive 
relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings is mitigated by the 
financial constraint status o f the firm based on the notion that CEOs o f a financially 
constrained firms may face difficulty accumulating excess cash as their inside debt 
compensation goes up since capital is limited. I adopt instrumental variable approach to 
explicitly address the endogeneity problem as CEO compensation is endogenously 
determined by firm and CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after 
endogeneity bias corrections and findings are robust to alternative specifications.
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Utilizing a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) valuation regression, I find 
that cash increases have a more positive valuation effect for firms with low levels o f CEO 
inside debt relative to those with high levels o f  CEO inside debt.
In the second essay, I examine the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on 
post-merger firm risk using acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f  2007 to 2 0 0 9 .1 
utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and 
post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the Merton 
distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the change in pre 
and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model 
(Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-acquisition minus pre­
acquisition stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in idiosyncratic risk 
measured as post-acquisition minus pre-acquisition standard deviation o f return residuals 
in percentage estimated by the single factor market model. Prior literature on CEO inside 
debt finds that CEO inside debt compensation motivates CEOs to engage in less risky 
investment and financial decisions. For example, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart 
(2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are associated with less risky 
investment and financial policies. Based on empirical findings o f  prior literature, I 
conjecture a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and post-merger firm 
risk. I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as measured by 
change in total firm risk, measured as post-acquisition minus pre-acquisition stock return 
standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as post­
acquisition minus pre-acquisition standard deviation of return residuals in percentage 
estimated by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured
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by the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. I adopt the instrumental variable approach to 
address the endogeneity problem as CEO compensation is endogenously determined by 
firm and CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias 
corrections.
As documented in Sundaram and Yermack (2007), by affecting both the overall 
level o f CEO compensation and its composition, CEO inside debt may influence 
managerial incentives to pursue diversifying mergers. Thus my research question o f 
whether and how CEO inside debt is related to post merger firm risk remains an 
important question. Similarly, CEO inside debt may affect corporate cash holdings o f a 
firm by influencing managerial incentives and so, my research question o f whether and 
how CEO inside debt is related to corporate cash holdings remains a key question.
Both essays make several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on 
executive compensation focus primarily on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and 
fixed (salary and bonus) compensation, while studies on debt-like compensation are 
limited due to data availability. CEO inside debt compensation is available only from 
2006 fiscal year as effective for 2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that 
firms disclose their CEOs’ inside debt positions. Both essays extend the literature by 
focusing on a different component o f CEO compensation, inside debt. Second, both 
essays provide a contribution to a nascent literature on executive compensation which 
investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigate agency costs o f debt by 
strengthening the alignment o f  CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). To date, extant research (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 
2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011;
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Francis and Yilmaz, 2012; He, 2011) has focused on market-based implications o f  CEO 
inside debt holdings (e.g. reduced cost o f debt, fewer restrictive debt covenants, market 
reactions after initial disclosures o f CEO inside debt compensation, financial reporting 
quality, etc.).
Finally, the first essay adds to the corporate cash holdings literature by 
documenting the effect o f  CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings. 
Prior literature documents several motives for firms to hold cash (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 
2009): the transaction motive, the precautionary motive, the tax motive, and the agency 
motive. The literature on corporate cash holdings empirically examines agency theory by 
viewing cash holdings as a source o f financing. My study contributes to the agency 
motive view o f corporate cash holdings literature by focusing on the investment 
perspective o f cash holdings and by exploring the link between CEO inside debt and 
corporate cash-holdings. The second essay adds to the M&A literature by documenting 
the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk. This is important 
because prior literature only examines the relation between CEO equity-based 
compensation and M&A (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman, 2001; Benson, Park and 
Davidson, 2011).
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Definition of Variables for First Essay
Dependent
Variable Definition and Data Source
Cash The ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets
holdings (A1/A6 -A l)
Data source: Compustat
Independent
Variable Definition and Data Source
CEO to firm The natural log o f one plus the ratio of the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio to
debt/equity the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. CEO's inside is calculated as sum o f the
ratio present value o f  accumulated pension benefits and deferred
compensation; CEO equity is calculated as the value o f both stock and
option held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated as the
number o f  shares multiply by the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal
year, and the value o f option is calculated as the total option delta
(calculated based on Black-Scholes (1973) option formula) multiply by
the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal year; firm's debt is the sum of
current and long-term debt; firm's equity is the product o f  shares
outstanding and the stock price at the end o f  firm's fiscal year.
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Compustat
CEO to firm A dummy variable with a value o f one if  CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
debt/equity is larger than none and zero otherwise
ratio>l
CEO inside The sum of the present value o f accumulated pension benefits and
debt holdings deferred compensation
Data source: Execucomp
Firm size The logarithm o f  total assets
Data source: Compustat
Dividend
payout A dummy variable that equals one if the regular cash dividends on
dummy common stock is positive in a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat
R&D/Sales The ratio of research and development expense to sales
Data source: Compustat
GIM Index The number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm's charter as reported
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and it
varies from 0 to 24.
Data source: Risk Metrics (IRRC)
NWC/Net
Assets The ratio o f net working capital to net assets
Data source: Compustat
Cash
flow/Net The ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before
Assets depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets
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Data source: Compustat
CAPEX/Net
Assets The ratio o f capital expenditures to net assets
Data source: Compustat 
Market-to- The book value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the
book ratio market value o f equity, all divided by the book value o f net assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities 
Leverage to net assets
Data source: Compustat 
CEO The ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity o f the value o f CEO's accumulated
vega/delta equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the volatility o f
ratio stock prices) to the delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f  the CEO's
accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the 
stock price). I adjust this CEO vega/delta ration by multiplying it by the 
ratio o f CEO equity-holdings to CEO inside debt holdings so that this 
measure captures the relative importance o f the CEO's equity holdings. 
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Compustat
Acquisition
activity The ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to net assets
_______________Data source: Compustat___________________________________________ _
Instruments Definition and Data Source
CEO age
Firm age 
Maximum 
state tax rate
Tax Status
Liquidity
Constraint
The age o f the CEO as reported in the Execucomp 
database
The number o f  years since the first year that the firm is reported 
in Compustat
The maximum state tax rate on individual income 
Data source: The tax rates are obtained from 
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/.
A dummy variable that equals to one if  the firm has a loss carry­
forward
and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat
A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm generates negative 
operating cash flow, and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat____________________________________
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Definition of Variables for Second Essay
Independent
Variable Definition and Data Source
CEO to firm
debt/equity
ratio
CEO to firm 
debt/equity 
ratio> 1 
CEO inside 
debt holdings
Firm size
Leverage
Tobin's Q
R&D/Total
Assets
Adv./Total
Assets
CAPEX/Sales
Stock Dummy 
CEO
vega/delta
ratio
The natural log o f one plus the ratio o f the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio to 
the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. CEO's inside is calculated as sum o f the 
present value o f accumulated pension benefits and deferred 
compensation; CEO equity is calculated as the value o f both stock and 
option held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated as the 
number o f shares multiply by the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal 
year, and the value o f option is calculated as the total option delta 
(calculated based on Black-Scholes (1973) option formula ) multiply 
by the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal year; firm's debt is the sum 
o f current and long-term debt; firm's equity is the product o f  shares 
outstanding and the stock price at the end o f  firm's fiscal year.
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Compustat
A dummy variable with a value o f  one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
is larger than none and zero otherwise
The sum o f the present value of accumulated pension benefits and
deferred compensation
Data source: Execucomp
The logarithm o f total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to 
book value o f total assets 
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book value o f debt to
the total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f research and development expense to total assets 
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f advertising expense to total assets 
Data source: Compustat 
The ratio o f capital expenditures to sales 
Data source: Compustat
An indicator variable with a value o f one if  the acquisition is financed 
entirely with stock 
Data source: SDC
The ratio of the vega (the sensitivity o f the value o f CEO's accumulated 
equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the volatility o f  
stock prices) to the delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f the CEO's 
accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the
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stock price). I adjust this CEO vega/delta ration by multiplying it by the 
ratio o f  CEO equity-holdings to CEO inside debt holdings so that this 
measure captures the relative importance o f the CEO's equity holdings 
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Compustat_________________________
Instruments Definition and Data Source
CEO age
Firm age 
Maximum 
state tax rate
Tax Status
Liquidity
Constraint
The age o f the CEO as reported in the Execucomp database
The number o f years since the first year that the firm is reported in
Compustat
The maximum state tax rate on individual income 
Data source: The tax rates are obtained from 
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/.
A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a loss carry­
forward
and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat
A dummy variable that equals to one if  the firm generates negative 
operating cash flow, and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat_______________________________________
